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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
Jurisdiction is appropriate with the Supreme Court pursuant to U.C. A. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
Final judgment in this case was entered on March 14, 2001. Notice of Appeal was filed on 
April 9, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. DID THE COURT ERR IN INTERPRETING THE 52 AMENDMENT TO 
THE 52 CONTRACT BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PRECLUDING THAYN FROM USING ITS 600 CFS NON-CONSUMPTIVE 
STATE APPROVED WATER RIGHT YEAR ROUND AND LIMITING HIM 
TO 435 CFS DURING THE IRRIGATION SEASON ONLY? 
Interpretation of contracts is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
Levanger v Vincent, 3 p.3d 187 (Ut. 2000). The existence of an ambiguity in a contract is 
a question of law. MunfordvLee Servicing Co., 999 P.2d 23 (Ut. App. 2000). The matter 
was preserved for appeal by virtue of memorandums in opposition to the original motion for 
summary judgment, (R. 151-153 a-v) and in opposition to the motion of GRCC for partial 
summary judgment (R. 454-472). 
II DID THE COURT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THAYN HAD A DUTY TO 
DISCOVER THE "UNRECORDED" 52 AMENDMENT AND BINDING HIM 
TO SAID AMENDMENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO NOTICE WAS 
EVER PROVIDED TO HIM UNTIL AFTER THE HYDRO ELECTRIC 
PLANT HAD BEEN BUILT? 
The Supreme Court gives no deference to a trial courts ruling on legal issues. A.R.v 
C.R. 982 P.2d 73 (Ut. 1999): An Appellate Court reviews questions of law for correctness. 
Marcis & Associates, Inc. v Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748 (Ut. App. 1999). This issue was 
t 
reserved at virtually every stage of the proceedings. Thayn first raised it in his original 
Affidavit in Support of Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment by GRCC (R. 40-45). It was further raised in objection to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R. 1419-1424). 
III. DID THE COURT ERR IN CONSTRUING THE CONTRACT IN A MANNER 
THAT VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY AND AFFORDING AN EQUITABLE 
REMEDY THEREFOR? 
The Court of Appeals review legal issues for correctness. Harmon City Inc. v Draper 
City, 997 P.2d 371. The Supreme Court reviews statutory interpretations for correctness and 
gives no deference to the conclusions of the trial court. Adkins v Uncle Barts, Inc. 1 P.3d 
528 (Utah 2000). The issue was preserved by arguments made at the hearing on Summary 
Judgment, (R. 1905) and the two Motions for Reconsideration filed by Thayn. 
IV. DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING THAYN FROM HIS STATUTORY 
RIGHTS UNDER U.C.A. § 73-1-6,7 INSOFAR AS POWER GENERATION 
FOR SALE IS CONCERNED? 
The Court of Appeals reviews legal decisions for correctness. Harmon City Inc. v 
Draper City, 997 P.2d 321 (Ut. App. 2000). The Supreme Court reviews statutory 
interpretations for correctness and gives no deference to the conclusions of the trial court. 
Adkins v Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528 (Ut. 2000). This issue was preserved for appeal by 
virtue of the arguments made in the Memorandum in Support for Summary Judgment, 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 151-153 a-v), the Motion to File 
Supplemental Complaint (R. 208-241) which motion was denied by the trial court. (R. 242-
244). 
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V. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ASSESSING ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR 
DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHEREIN 
GRCC WAS BUILDING AN OBSTRUCTION WALL TO IMPEDE THAYN'S 
WATER IN THE CANAL DURING THE COURSE OF THIS ACTION, 
WHICH CONDUCT WAS IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 73-1-15? 
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court reviews statutory interpretation for correctness and 
gives no deference to the conclusions of the trial court. Adkins vs Uncle Bart's Inc., 1 P.3d 
528 (Ut. 2000). The issue was preserved in the lower court with a memorandum in objection 
to the application for attorney's fees. (R. 761-772). 
VI. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN APPLYING THE STANDARDS OF 
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER AND LATCHES AND IN CONCLUDING THAT 
GRCC HAD NO DUTY TO PROTEST THAYN'S WATER FILING IF GRCC 
INTENDED TO RELY ON ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 52 
AMENDMENT? 
The Court of Appeals reviews legal issues for correctness. Harmon City Inc. v 
Draper City, 997 P.2d 321 (Ut. App. 2000). The Supreme Court gives no deference to the 
trial courts ruling on legal issues. A.R.v C.R. 982 P.2d 73 (1999). 
These issues were reserved in the record by virtue of Defendant's Objection to the 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 1419-1424) and its Post Trial 
Memorandum Regarding Estoppel, Waiver and Latches (R. 1242-1282). 
VII. DID THE COURT ERR GRANTING GRCC'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN PRECLUDING EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
REGARDING MAINTENANCE ISSUES, WHILE ALLOWING GRCC TO 
ATTEST IT WAS NOT GETTING ITS WATER? 
The judgment of the trial court admitting or excluding evidence will not be reversed 
unless it is shown that the discretion therein has been abused. Terry v Zions Coop 
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Mercantile Institute, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979) overruled on other grounds, McFarland v 
Skaggs Co., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). "Abuse of discretion" means a trial court has 
exceeded the range of discretion allowed for a particular act under review; it should not be 
misread to imply a conscious and intentional violation of permitted discretion by the trial 
judge. Riviera v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 539 (Utah 2000). The Supreme 
Court applies the same standard as the trial court on review of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Briggsv Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Ut. App. 1987). 
This issue was reserved by objection and arguments made at trial in attempt to get 
said evidence admitted. (R. 1902, U. L, pp. 74-87.) It was specifically raised in answer to 
GRCC's Second Supplemental Complaint wherein GRCC asserted it was not getting its full 
80cfs. (R. 256, 258.) 
VIII. DID THE COURT ERR IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT AGAINST THE 
CLEAR AND UNDISPUTABLE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE? 
The Supreme Court upholds the lower court's findings of fact unless the evidence supporting 
them is so lacking that the court must concede the finding is clearly erroneous. Desert Miriah, Inc. 
v B & L Auto, Inc., 12 p.3d, 580 (Ut. 2000). This issue was preserved in the record by objections 
to the findings of fact and post trial memoranda (R. 1419-1424; 981-1019; 1192-1220). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Approximately six (6) miles north of the City of Green River, Utah lies certain water 
diversion facilities at the heart of this dispute. (Ex. 54, A-l). Spanning the width of the 
Green River is a crescent shaped concrete dam, which serves to raise the height of the water 
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some eight feet (R.1905, p.6; Ex. 54, A-l). While the bulk of the water spills over the dam 
and continues on downstream, water is nonetheless diverted at both banks of the river. (R. 
1905. p.6). On the east, water is channeled to the Eastside Water Users, (Ex. 54, A-6). On 
the west bank, water is channeled to the parties herein. Plaintiff/Appellee Green River Canal 
Company (hereinafter "GRCC") consists of approximately thirty-one (31) stockholders, 
seven (7) of which have modest sized farms, and the remainder of which utilize water for 
domestic irrigation and/or stock watering. (Ex. 54, Appendix 1). Total acreage by survey 
being served by GRCC is 1,443.50. (R. 1369). GRCC holds a state approval water right for 
a maximum flow of 60 cfs during the irrigation season, inclusive of a 20 cfs stock watering 
right year round. (R. 1353,1365-1369). Further, GRCC is subject to a "duty" or limitation 
of 5,774.00 acre feet per annum for irrigation and 75.60 for stock watering. (R. 1369). 
Defendant/Appellant Lee Thayn (hereinafter "Thayn") is the successor in interest to 
a farm and appurtenant water rights purchased from Wilson Produce Company (hereinafter 
"Wilson") under a contract for sale in 1979. Thayn's farm is approximately 1,362 acres. (R. 
40-45, Ex. 54, Appendix A-2). 
In addition to the dam, the west side diversion facilities consist of a 40 foot wide 
2,500 foot long unlined canal (hereinafter referred to as the "raceway"). (R.40-45; Ex. 54 A-
2). The dam lies on state property (Green River) and a portion of the raceway crosses 
Bureau of Land Management property, with the lower portion of the raceway crossing 
GRCC property and Thayn property. (Ex.54, Figure A-2). Diverted water flows southerly 
down the raceway through a set of "control gates" which can be utilized to restrict the flow 
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of water for maintenance or repair on the raceway. (R. 40-45, Ex. 54 A-3 and Figure A-2). 
Water continues to the foot of the raceway wherein a significantly smaller canal owned by 
GRCC continues the flow to its shareholders southerly, towards the city of Green River, (id). 
GRCC has a headgate at the point its ditch meets the raceway to either permit or restrict 
water to flow into its ditch, (id). 
Perpendicular to, and abutting directly east of the GRCC canal inlet, along the east 
bank of the raceway, at the foot of the raceway, is a building known as the pump 
house/power house, which building also abuts the west side of the Green River. (R. 1905, p.6, 
Ex. 54, Figure A-2). Incorporated into the pump house is a set of "radial gates" which can 
be opened to flush water through the raceway rapidly, returning virtually the entire flow of 
the raceway back to the river. (R. 1905, p.7, Ex. 54, Figure A-2). Periodically Thayn opens 
the radial gates briefly to flush silt and sand buildup from the raceway. (R. 40-45). When 
the radial gates are closed, all raceway water not flowing down GRCC's canal goes under 
the pump house through a set of turbines or to Thayn's irrigation pumps. As originally 
acquired from Wilson, there were two (2) turbines providing mechanical power to two (2) 
pumps to lift Thayn's irrigation water some forty-two (42) feet to Thayn's canal running 
along a hillside to the east of GRCC's property. (R. 40-45, Ex. 54, Figure A-2.). The 
facilities were originally constructed in 1906, by Pearson and Taft (Wilson's predeceasor) 
(R. Ex.54, A-5, E-25). There was no substantial improvement or modification to the 
facilities until Thayn renovated, upgraded and put in a small co-generation facility in 1992 
at a cost of some $300,000, spawning the present action. (R. 40-45). 
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Lee Thayn and his brother Leon Thayn originally contracted to purchase the farm and 
water rights from Wilson in 1979 (R. 40). At the time of closing (1981) of the property, the 
following water rights were established of record with the State Engineer's Office: Nov. 17, 
1933 Certificate of Appropriation filed by Wilson for 35 second feet (consumptive) for 
irrigation March 1 to December 1, of each year, approved 10/13/52, certificate No. 4617; 
(Ex. 54, Appendix 2) Application to Appropriate Water, 600 cfs for power, noting plant has 
been in operation since 1907, approved 4/1/75 (non-consumptive) (id) , Application No. 
44455 and Change Application No. A-12054 filed by Wilson at Thayn's request on 5/11/81 
to have the 600 cfs power right be year round, approved 9/2/83 (without protest by 
GRCC)(R. 82-84; See also R. 40-45). GRCC's water right is 60 cfs with a5,904 acre foot 
limitation. 
After purchase of the property in 1979, Thayn and his brother initially attempted a 
large scale hydro-electric project in conjunction with National Hydro Corporation of Boston, 
Mass. (R. 43). That project was known as the National Hydro project and called for 
expansion of the raceway to accommodate 4,100 cfs non-consumptive. (R. 43-44). Thayn 
applied for the 1,400 cfs from the State, (Ex. 54, Appendix 2) which was originally protested 
by GRCC. Eventually a proposed contract was entered into with GRCC and Thayns 
regarding the National Hydro project, which contract obligated GRCC to provide land for 
development of a new, enlarged power house, and expansion of the raceway, together with 
withdrawal of the protest filed by GRCC to the application for 1,400 cfs. Thayns were not 
obligated to proceed with National Hydro, but if it was eventually built, GRCC would 
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receive one percent (1%) of the hydro-electric proceeds for 15 years, and two percent (2%) 
thereafter, less 863,000 Kilowatt hours which was calculated as Thayns power demand to 
pump his irrigation water. (R. 44; Ex. 54, Appendix 1). Wilsons and Thayns had been using 
their approved 600 cfs to supply the "power demand" of the pumps. 
National Hydro fell through due to environmental protests and other reasons. (R.44). 
Thayn learned of the April 15,1952 agreement between GRCC and Wilson at about the time 
they purchased the property. (R. 40-45; Ex. 54, Appendix 1). This agreement purports to 
be a covenant running with the land, (Ex. 45). None of the copies of the April 1, 1952 
agreement (hereinafter "52 agreement") submitted at summary judgment or trial show any 
recording with either the State Engineers' office or the County Recorder. However, a copy 
of the 52 agreement in the National Hydro Federal Energy Regulator Commission (FERC) 
Application shows an instrument No. 79787, that was found in County records Book E. (Ex. 
54, Appendix 1). The 52 agreement was a settlement of disputes between GRCC and 
Wilson, including a then pending lawsuit as to which party owned which facilities, who 
would pay maintenance costs, and the priorities of water rights. Under the agreement, the 
dam, portions of the raceway and certain real property were transferred by Wilson to GRCC, 
the pump house, and all appurtenances were to be deeded to Wilson, parties were to split 
equally the maintenance costs on the dam and raceway, and priority of water usage was set 
forth in paragraph 6 as follows: 
It is understood and agreed that before the party of the second part can or may 
use any water from said dam, diverting works or raceway that the first party 
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shall have enough and sufficient water to supply its stockholders. The 
quantity of water to supply the stock holders of the first party is to be 
exclusively determined by the first party. 
Further, each party covenanted to cooperate with the other for mutual use and benefit 
of the facilities. (R. 107-113; 67-73). 
After failure of National Hydro, Thayn re-explored a small co-generation project, and 
ultimately obtained a FERC exemption for a small scale co-generation facility. (R.44), at 
which time they met Rick Kaster. (R. 1902, V. IV., p.77). Rick Kaster works on 
hydroelectric plants, pumps and mechanical things. (R. 1902, V. Ill, p. 176). Mr. Kaster 
made a proposal in 1988 regarding refurbishing of the pump house and perhaps selling 
power surplus over and above Thayn's pumping needs to finance the rebuilding. (R. 1902 
V. Ill, p. 180-181). Mr. Kaster first focused on rebuilding the pumps, cleaning up the 
building and prep work. (R. 1902 V. Ill, p. 187-188). In late 1989 or early 1990 he began 
looking for turbines and generators (id). In the summer of 1990 he found some used 
equipment that would match this site, and the decision was made to commence the project. 
(R. 1902, V. Ill, pp. 90,191). A verbal agreement was made among Lee Thayn, Leon Thayn 
and Rick Kaster to share profits as to the surplus power generated by the newer, more 
efficient turbines and ownership of the turbines and generators. (R. 1902, V. Ill, pp. 96-98). 
Both Kaster and Leon Thayn told numerous people of their intent to go forward with a co-
generation facility. (R. 1902, B. IV, p 9, V, III, p. 9) including attending meetings with 
GRCC. (R. 1902, V. Ill, p. 56-57). It was common knowledge throughout the area that 
Thayns were doing the co-generation project. (R. 1902, V. Ill, p. 111; see also testimony 
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of Clinton Thompson, ditch rider for GRCC, (R. V. I, p.87); Blaine Silliman, GRCC Board 
member and vice-president in 1989 and President 1991-92, (R. 1902 R. V. I, p.138); Olive 
Anderson, Green River City councilwoman and GRCC shareholder, (R. 1902, V. I., p. 156); 
Bernard Lassen, GRCC shareholder, (R. 1902 V. I., p. 167); Odell Anderson, Green River 
resident, (R. 1902, V. I, p. 188-190); Robert Seely, GRCC shareholder, (R. 1902 V. I, p. 
200). GRCC minutes reflect the board's knowledge of Thayns co-generation project. (Ex. 
98, minutes of 1/9/90, 1/7/92, 3/26/92). In fact, the 1/7/92 minutes of GRCC discloses that 
Leon Thayn told GRCC the amount Utah Power and Light would pay for the electricity to 
be generated. (Ex. 98). The facility was rebuilt and went online in May 1992. (R. 1902, V. 
IV, p.36). After Thayn began generating electricity the board presented Thayns with an 
"amendment" to the 1952 agreement dated September 30,1952, which had also been signed 
by Wilson. (R. 1902, V. IV, pp.84-85; see also Ex. 66). Neither Thayns nor Kaster would 
have proceeded with the project if there had been any question about the right to use the 600 
cfs non-consumptive year round. (R. 1902, V. IV, pp. 13,82). By the time GRCC presented 
the September 1952 amendment (hereinafter "52 amendment") Thayns had already 
expended over $300,000 in the project. (R. 40-45). Nowhere in the record is there any 
evidence that the 52 amendment was recorded or filed with the State Engineer's office. 
The 52 amendment provides in relevant part that: 
That the meaning of paragraph 6 of said original agreement was intended to 
be that the first party should have a priority of diversion, and should be 
entitled to take whatever water should be needed by the said first party or its 
stockholders before the second party should be entitled to divert any water 
through or over the dam and diversion works; and that the quantity of water 
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needed should be exclusively determined by the said first party. However, it 
was and is also mutually understood and agreed that the first party claims for 
the uses of its stockholders 80 second feet of water as particularly set forth in 
that certain diligence claim No. 46 on file and of record in the office of the 
State Engineer of the State of Utah and that after said rights are satisfied 
through diversion at said dam and diverting works that the water rights of the 
second party as set forth in its water filing about to be issued by said State 
Engineer for 35 second feet of water for irrigation uses upon approximately 
1,325 acres of land, as well as its filings for power purposes to pump said 
water not to exceed 400 second feet or such lesser amount as may be approved 
by the State Engineer of the State of Utah shall then be satisfied through 
diversions at said dam and diverting works before any other or additional 
diversions are made, by the first party. [Emphasis added] 
This lawsuit then ensued. GRCC filed its original complaint on 6/17/95 (R.I.-2) 
alleging breach of contract (Count One) for utilizing the diversion works in excess of the 52 
amendment, breach of contract (Count Two) for assigning a portion of his rights to a third 
party, equitable relief (Count Three) loss of profits and for an injunction (Count Four). 
Thayn answered and counterclaimed denying that GRCC owned all of the diversion 
facilities, admitting that his predecessor in interest entered into the 52 agreement and the 52 
amendment, but denying that GRCC's interpretation of the agreement and the amendment 
precluded his use of his water right for co-generation activity. As affirmative defenses, 
Thayn raised the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, arguing that the real nature of the 
breach of contract and injunction claims was not for damages, but was an attempt to extort 
profits from Thayn. Thayn further averred that U.C. A. §73-1-7 provided a right of eminent 
domain to Thayn, that GRCC had an adequate remedy at law if in fact any damages really 
occurred, and raised laches, estoppel and waiver. Thayn also counterclaimed for his attorney 
fees and costs. (R. 23-28). 
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On June 28, 1996 Thayn filed a Motion for Summary Judgment together with the 
Affidavit of Lee Thayn pointing out that while Wilson, Thayn's predecessor, had initially 
filed a water right claim for 35 cfs consumptive and 600 cfs non-consumptive power, during 
irrigation season only, in 1975, subsequently Wilson, on behalf of Thayn, filed a second 
application with the State Engineer's office in 1981. This second application was to change 
the non-consumptive 600 cfs power use to year round. (R. 50-51). Both applications were 
approved. (R. 40-45). Thayn argued that inasmuch as there was never an increase or actual 
change of use by Wilson, and no modifications were made to the diversion facilities, and 
because GRCC had never objected to Wilson's use or protested Water Right applications 
filed by him, or alleged any breach of contract as against Wilson, that Thayn's use of 600 
cfs for hydroelectric power generation and irrigation power pumping should not be 
prohibited under the contract. Thayn sought summary judgment under theories of estoppel, 
latches or waiver. Thayn further argued the contract and amendment set up only a system 
of priorities and that the terms of the amendment as to the parties' various water rights were 
intended only as descriptive of the parties' rights, not intending to forever preclude through 
the eons of time any future water rights or water right usages. Alternatively, Thayn argued 
he had a statutory right of eminent domain to utilize the raceway, provided he pay any 
damages said use might cause and contribute pro-rata to maintenance of the dam and 
raceway under U. C. A. § 73-1-7. 
As to the claim for profits by GRCC, Thayn cited numerous cases that the measure 
of damages for a canal appropriator is not the benefit to the appropriator, but the diminution 
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in value to the canal company. Accordingly, under the facts of the present case, GRCC 
would get only minimal damages. (R. 48-85). 
GRCC filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment on the same date, 6/28/96 
asserting that the 52 agreement and amendment must be interpreted as not merely descriptive 
of the parties' water rights, but as the quantative limit of both the rights and uses of the 
parties, and any successors in interest, forever and ever. Inasmuch as GRCC had no 
substantive damages, they argued for injunctive relief and specific performance. (R. 
910104). 
In opposition to Thayn's Motion for Summary Judgment, GRCC argued estoppel was 
not applicable, that Thayn could not reasonably rely upon GRCC's inaction over some 40 
years as a basis for constructing a $300,000 co-generation facility. Further, GRCC 
contended that U.C.A. § 73-1-7 requires a "proceeding" and that mere affirmative defense 
is inapplicable. It then argued that nominal damages are an inadequate remedy at law, and 
accordingly an injunction should issue. (R. 117-143). 
In response, Thayn filed a Motion for leave to file an amended and supplemental 
counterclaim seeking to raise U.C.A. § 73-1-7 as a counterclaim as well as an action to seek 
enlargement/clean out of the raceway. (R. 148-150). 
Thayn responded to GRCC's Motion for Summary Judgment by pointing out the 
amendment expressly purports to clarify paragraph six (6) of the 52 agreement. That said 
amendment set up a system of priorities by which GRCC would not have an unlimited first 
position priority. Thayn further contended that the amendment language is ambiguous and 
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that the court should look to the parties' course of conduct in interpreting the intent of the 
agreement. Since Wilson had attained a water right of 600 cfs, non-consumptive power 
right, and since no enlargement of the facilities had taken place since 1952 and Wilson's use 
of the water never changed, the Court should construe the contract in accordance with the 
parties' own conduct. Thayn pointed out the lack of protest by GRCC to Wilson's 1975 and 
1981 water right applications and contrasted that to the 1981 application filed by Wilson 
with respect to the National Hydro contract (to which GRCC did protest but subsequently 
withdrew its protest after agreeing to the National Hydro project). That application sought 
1,400 cfs. If, in fact, Wilson's 600 non-consumptive power right was a violation of the 52 
agreement, why did not GRCC protest? Thayn points out the Vetere Affidavit which claims 
GRCC did not know of Thayn's purported use for co-generation until 1992 is not a defense 
to estoppel; that it is the quantity of the non-consumptive water right to which Thayn sought 
to estopp GRCC. How Mr. Thayn chooses to best use his water right was not a proper 
inquiry for the Court. (R. 151-153). 
Thayn further addressed GRCC's argument that the value of a canal company rests 
in its ability to exclude others. Thayn argued there is no basis in law for such reasoning, that 
by virtue of U.C.A. § 73-1-7 the canal company does not possess the right to exclude, only 
the right to demand contribution of maintenance costs, and dimuneration in value to GRCC, 
if any. (R. 153 K-P). 
In reply, GRCC argued latches was inapplicable because it asserted Thayn did not put 
GRCC on notice of Thayn's plans for the small co-generation facility. GRCC asserted that 
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mere silence is ineffective to constitute a waiver without an affirmative duty to speak. 
GRCC argued Thayn had a duty of good faith to abide by the contract, so it had no duty to 
speak out. Finally GRCC maintained U.C.A. § 73-1-7 is unconstitutional if it allows 
interference with their private property rights. However, says GRCC, since the parties here 
have a contract, the contract controls and U.C.A. §73-1 -7 is inapplicable. (Citing Gunnison-
Fayette Canal Co. v Roberts, 12 Utah 2d 153, 364 P.2d 103, 105 (1961). 
Oral argument on the pending Summary Judgment motions were heard on October 
15, 1996, after which the Court, Hon. Bryce K. Bryner presiding, took the matter under 
advisement. (R. 186). Thereafter, GRCC filed the Affidavit of James Tippets who 
purported to have done water flow measurements of the raceway. (R. 189-195). Thayne 
objected and filed a second Affidavit of Lee Thayn. (R. 200-202. The Court then denied 
Thayn's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Counterclaim, (R. 242-244), holding that 
U.C.A. § 73-1-7 is precluded in any situation where the parties have an existing contract in 
place. No mention is made about Thayn's claim to have the raceway cleaned or expanded, 
but said claim was denied by virtue of the denial of leave to file the Supplemental 
Counterclaim, (id). 
GRCC also moved to file a Supplemental Complaint, and then moved to file a second 
Supplemental Complaint, (R. 263-311), which was stipulated to by defense counsel. (R. 254) 
The Second Supplemental Complaint incorporated the prior four causes of action, and 
added Trespass (fifth cause of action), punitive damages (Count six), a claim for injunction 
against Thayn going onto GRCC property (Count seven), Declaratory Relief (Count eight), 
15 
a claim for injunction that Thayne receive no water until GRCC has a full eighty cfs (with 
no duty) during the irrigation season and 20 cfs all year (Count nine) and "Wrongful 
diversion" (Count ten). (R. 263-311). 
Thayne answered the Second Supplemental Complaint, denying most of the new 
allegations, reincorporating its prior defenses and asserting that any failure of GRCC to 
receive 80 cfs was due to its own failure to properly maintain the diversion works the 
raceway, the dam and its own canal (R. 256-259). 
The Court then entered its ruling on the Motion to Strike Affidavit and on Reciprocal 
Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 314-318). 
Despite the fact that neither party requested partial summary judgment, the Court 
entered what can only be deemed a "conditional" partial summaryjudgment. The Court held 
there was disputed material issues of fact regarding latches, estoppel and waiver precluding 
summary judgment, but then held that the 1952 amendment and agreement were 
unambiguous, certain, definite and limit Thayn to 435 cfs for irrigation and to pump the 
irrigation water. There is no opportunity to expand or enlarge Thayn's right, presumably 
forever. The Court held that injunction was the proper remedy because there was only 
nominal damages and that any damages actually suffered would be impossible to prove. 
Finally the Court reiterated its position that U.C.A. § 73-1-7 was inapplicable where there 
was an existing contract between the parties. These rulings were to take effect after trial on 
the estoppel, waiver and latches issues. 
At this juncture Reed Martineau, of Snow Christensen and Martineau, substituted in 
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as counsel for John Waldo. Mr. Martineau moved to extend the discovery schedule and trial 
date (R. 351), which was ultimately granted. (R. 451). GRCC then filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on its eighth and ninth causes of action seeking a permanent injunction 
and declaratory relief that GRCC get its full eighty (80) cfs during the irrigation season and 
20 cfs all year prior to Thayn receiving any water. (R. 359-405). Thayn opposed arguing 
that GRCC only had a State water right to 60 cfs during the irrigation season and 20 cfs year 
round, and that the 20 was inclusive in the sixty (60) during the irrigation season, (R. 461-
462), not cumulative. In response to GRCC's claim that Thayn was trespassing on GRCC 
property for some repair work which caused two (2) trees (believed dead) to be removed, 
Thayn argued he was only doing work made necessary by GRCC's repeated failure to do 
demanded maintenance work on the raceway. (R. 454-460). Court granted Partial Summary 
Judgment and struck from the record the Affidavit of Leon Thayn (which contained GRCC's 
State approved water right document showing that GRCC only had a 60 cfs right, not an 80 
cfs right), and entered an injunction against Thayn that GRCC receive 80 cfs during the 
irrigation season and 20 cfs all year before Thayn receives any water. (R. 497-98). 
Thereafter, Thayn applied for a Temporary Restraining Order due to the fact that GRCC 
was attempting to construct a forty (40') foot wall extending out from its canal into the 
raceway, adjacent to and in front of Thayn's pump house thereby impeding, if not blocking, 
the flow of water to Thayn. (R. 524-539). TRO was granted, but subsequently dissolved 
after evidentiary hearing on March 23, 1999 on the preliminary injunction, GRCC arguing 
that Thayn could not prevail on the merits as he had no counterclaim pending regarding the 
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wall1, and because Thayn's injury would be compensable by money damages. (R.621-626). 
Thayn appealed by interlocutory appeal said denial of the Preliminary Injunction, which was 
rejected by this Court, Case No. 990303, Order Denying Injunction Pending Appeal, dated 
5/24/99. 
Thayn then filed a Motion to Reconsider the Summary Judgment arguing that GRCC 
only had a 60 cfs State approved water right, not 80 cfs (R. 571-593). Thayn also filed on 
March 26, 1999 a Motion to Allow a Second Amended Counterclaim raising the lack of 
maintenance by GRCC issues as a counterclaim, not merely an affirmative defense. (R. 594-
603). 
The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration citing that "there were no new 
material facts or legal theories not considered by the Court at the time of the previous 
ruling". (R. 873-874). The Court further denied the Motion to File a Second Amended 
Counterclaim reasoning there was insufficient time for Plaintiff to do additional discovery 
without changing the trial date. (R. 871-872).2 
Thereafter, GRCC filed a Motion in Liming to limit Thayn's use of witnesses and 
evidence at trial to Discovery responses already provided and not to allow an deviation from 
responses to admissions already filed. (R.739-760). In particular, GRCC sought to preclude 
!The 40 foot wall was subsequently ordered removed by Federal Authorities and is not at 
issue in this appeal. On remand, the District Court awarded attorney fees and costs which is 
appealed herein. 
2The maintenance issues had already been raised as a defense. Presumably very little 
discovery would be necessary. 
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Thayn under a theory of unclean hands from denying he had somehow promised to share 
revenue from the hydro plant with GRCC.3 The Court granted the Motion in Limine on the 
discovery issues (R. 867-870)., and denied the motion to limit Thayn from being able to 
argue estoppel at trial. (R. 909-911). 
The Court directed trial proceed first on Thayn's defenses of estoppel, waiver and latches, 
thence upon the remaining claims of GRCC for trespass (claiming certain improvements to 
the pump house encroached upon the real property deeded GRCC under the 52 agreement 
including the trash racks and the radial gates) and the claim for profits whereby GRCC 
sought all past gross revenues of Thayn from the hydro electric plant. (R. 865). Trial was 
held on May 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, June 17, 18 and 22.4 
Subsequently, GRCC filed a Motion for Contempt contending they were not getting 
their full 80cfs. A hearing was held on August 6,1999, at which hearing the Court heard the 
testimony of Jack Barnett, expert witness for GRCC who attested that he took measurements 
on the canal and raceway showing 532 cfs in the raceway and 692 cfs in the canal. (R. 1901, 
P. 21). Accordingly, in his opinion, GRCC was not getting a full 80 cfs in the canal. 
In Opposition to the Motion for Contempt, Thayn called David Hansen as his 
expert who also took measurements in the raceway and the canal showing measurements 
3GRCC's position was that it never knew the hydro plant was under construction, yet at 
the same time had oral promises from Leon to share the revenues. 
4A detailed discussion of the evidence at trial on the estoppel, latches and waiver issues is 
contained in the argument section under issue VIII infra as Appellant was required to marshall 
the evidence there. 
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between 78 to 82 cfs. (id. at 137-138). He further attested that if the canal company would 
remove three (3) feet of silt from the bottom of its canal, that would increase the flow 
significantly, (id. at 145). In his opinion, there was adequate water in the raceway to meet 
all of the 800 cfs needs, but that there was a restriction in the canal limiting the canal flows. 
(id.) He opined that the two (2) major factors that needed to be fixed were cleaning the canal 
and enlarging the inverted siphon inside the canal, (id.) At the conclusion of the testimony 
on GRCC's Motion for Contempt, the Court ruled that, inasmuch as GRCC had no 
measuring device, it had failed to meet its burden of proof on contempt with regard to how 
much water was or was not flowing down its canal. (R. 1082-1087). 
Thereafter, the parties filed their post trial memorandums and the Court entered its 
Memorandum Decision Regarding Estoppel, Waiver and Latches on April 13, 2000. (R. 
1395-1402). It also entered Memorandum Decisions regarding the issues of trespass (R. 
1515-1517) and GRCC filed a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration on the trespass 
issue. (R. 1518-1533). After a number of objections and memorandums regarding the 
rulings and/or proposed Findings of Fact, the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law Regarding Estoppel, Waiver and Latches and its Judgment on the First, Fourth, 
Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action and on the Affirmative Defenses of Estoppel and Waiver 
on March 14, 2001. (R. 1657-1673). This appeal, followed by a Notice of Appeal filed on 
April 9, 2001. (R. 1714-1715). 
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE 52 AMENDMENT TO THE 
52 CONTRACT BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRECLUDING 
THAYN FROM USING ITS 600 CFS NON-CONSUMPTIVE STATE 
APPROVED WATER RIGHT YEAR ROUND AND LIMITING HIM TO 435 
CFS DURING THE IRRIGATION SEASON ONLY. 
Interpretation of contracts is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
Levanger v Vincent, 3 p.3d 187 (Ut. 2000). The existence of an ambiguity in a contract is 
a question of law. Munford v Lee Servicing Co., 999 P.2d 23 (Ut. App. 2000). The matter 
was preserved for appeal by virtue of memorandums in opposition to the original motion for 
summary judgment, (R. 151-153 a-v) and in opposition to the motion of GRCC for partial 
summary judgment (R. 454-472). 
The gist of both the original motion for summary judgment filed by GRCC, and its 
motion for partial summary judgment was to preclude Thayn from utilizing his State 
approved water right for 600 cfs all year round. GRCC sought, and successfully obtained, 
orders restricting Thayn to 400 cfs power right and 35 cfs consumptive right during the 
irrigation season only. The basis for said restriction was the 52 agreement and the 52 
amendment. This Court reviews these decisions giving no deference to the rulings of the 
trial court. Levanger v Vincent, supra. While the analysis begins by looking at the contract, 
it does not end there. For example, in Peterson v Severe Valley Canal Company, 151 P.2d 
477 (Ut. 1944) the Court was faced with interpreting a contract regarding the assessment of 
maintenance costs between the Severe Valley Canal Company and the Paiute Reservoir and 
Irrigation Company. The Court noted: 
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From the recitals of the contract and the record and the course of conduct, it 
is apparent that the parties intended the contract to apply only to Defendant's 
main water canal, and that they were contemplating certain unusual expenses 
in the operation and maintenance of such canal during the season. The costs 
of operating said canal which are prorated by the provisions of paragraph 2, 
do not include the costs of maintaining and operating the laterals leading 
therefrom. To say that the italicized clause above set out prohibits any further 
charges made against the Paiute company stockholders on a count of 
maintenance of said laterals, would require the Defendant to flow Plaintiffs 
water through its ditches without charge for the costs of maintaining and 
operating those ditches. We conclude that the contract does not prohibit the 
accessing of maintenance charges against Plaintiff for maintaining the laterals, 
but that it applies to the main canal only. (id. 479). 
The language of the contract specifically stated "that there shall be no further charges 
against the Paiute Reservoir and Irrigation Company or its stockholders for turning out 
water, for irrigation services, etc." The Peterson Court declined to apply a strict 
interpretation of that clause, and instead applied a common sense approach taking into 
consideration the parties course of conduct and common sense reasoning. Appellant Thayn 
seeks nothing less herein. 
In the present case, the original 52 agreement contains no merger clause. It does not 
purport to be the entire contract of the parties, nor does it recite that all understandings and 
agreements are incorporated therein. Rather, it is a resolution of an existing lawsuit by 
which certain portions of the real property are transferred by and between the parties in 
accordance with their respective needs and uses. It contains a paragraph dividing equally 
the maintenance costs of the commonly utilized facilities and a covenant that each party shall 
"keep the portion of said diverting works under its supervision in a state of reasonably good 
repair and condition so that insofar as the diverting works situated on the lands described in 
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paragraphs 2 and 3 respective of this agreement are integral to or essential to the use, 
operation and enjoyment of the other party that the same will be maintained and kept in 
reasonably good repair and condition at all times". (R. 278). It is a contract that says what 
they do agree to, it is not a contract precluding any further or other agreements or 
understandings. The trial court focused on the 52 amendment ( of which Thayn had no 
notice, nor could he reasonably be charged with notice), particularly paragraph 1 which 
provides in full text as follows: 
That the meaning of paragraph 6 of said original agreement was intended to 
be that the first party should have a priority of diversion, and should be 
entitled to take whatever water should be needed by said first party [GRCC] 
or its stockholders before the second party [Wilson] should be entitled to 
divert any water through or over the dam and diversion works; and that the 
quantity of water needed should be exclusively determined by the said first 
party. However it was and is mutually understood and agreed that the first 
party claims for use of its stockholders 80 second feet of water as particularly 
set forth in that diligence claim No. 46 on file and of record in the office of the 
State Engineer of the State of Utah and that after said rights are satisfied 
through diversion at said dam and diverting works that the water rights of the 
second party as set forth in its water filing about to be issued by said State 
Engineer for 35 cfs of water for irrigation uses upon approximately 1,325 
acres of land, as well as its filing for power purposes to pump said water in not 
to exceed 400 second feet or such lesser amount as may be approved by the 
State Engineer of the State of Utah shall then be satisfied through diversions 
at the dam and diverting works before any other or additional diversions are 
made, by the first party. 
It is apparent from a review of this contract that Wilsons water right filing had not yet 
been determined and that same was still to be determined. Moreover, the quantity of water 
allotted to the first party is limited to that water "needed". Although the contract provides 
that the first party has the exclusive right to determine what it needs, that provision must be 
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read in light of the duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed in all contracts. Malibu 
Investment Company v Sparks, 996 p.2d 1043 (Ut. 2000) (as a general rule, every contract 
is subject to an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, under which both parties to a 
contract promise not to intentionally or purposefully do anything which will destroy or injure 
the other parties right to receive the fruits of a contract). Thayn maintained below in its 
motion for reconsideration, and on this appeal, that although GRCC claimed 80 cfs in its 
application to the State Engineer's office, GRCC was only allotted 60 cfs, inclusive of its 20 
cfs year round stock watering right. Thus, under the covenant of good faith, GRCC cannot 
determine that it "needs" a greater water right than it is actually allotted by law. In fact, not 
only is such a claim a violation of the duty of good faith, it goes to such an extreme point as 
to be actually criminal conduct. U.C.A. § 73-3-3(9) provides: 
Any person who changes or attempts to change a point of diversion place or 
purpose of use, either permanently or temporarily, without first applying to the 
State Engineer in the manner provided in this section: (a) obtains no right; and 
(b) is guilty of a misdemeanor, each day of the unlawful change constituting 
a separate offense separately punishable. 
Further, U.C.A. § 76-10-202 mandates in relevant part: 
Every person who, in violation of any right of any other person, willfully turns 
or uses the water, or any part thereof, of any canal, ditch, pipeline or reservoir, 
except at a time when the use of the water has been duly distributed to the 
person^ or willfully uses any greater quantity of the water than has duly 
distributed him, ...is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. [Emphasis added] 
In the present case GRCC has been allotted by the State only 60 cfs during the 
irrigation season as its maximum flow rate, and subject to an acre foot limitation. But what 
GRCC has attempted (heretofore successfully) to do in this proceeding is to change both the 
24 
maximum flow volume and the duty restrictions, to unlimited 80 cfs, prior to junior water 
right holders such as Thayn. Of course, the State Engineer was not joined as a party to this 
proceeding, not by mere omission Thayn asserts, but by deliberate intention. While Thayn's 
counsel could be criticized for not having raised the 60 cfs issue at the original Motion for 
Summary Judgment, which was denied subject to certain defenses, Thayn certainly did raise 
the issue in the Motion for Reconsideration. Once the trial court was aware that the right of 
GRCC was less than the right it asserted under the contract, the trial court was obligated not 
to participate in a criminal conspiracy to thwart the water right statutes. 
What is at issue here is not mere private property rights. The legislature has declared 
that the use of water is a public use, stating "the use of water for beneficial purposes, as 
provided in this title, is hereby declared to be a public use". U.C.A. 73-1-5. This is further 
supported by a right of Eminent Domain granted to all persons of this state as follows: 
Any person shall have a right of way across and upon public, private and 
corporate lands, or other rights of way, for the construction, maintenance, 
repair and use of all necessary reservoirs, dams, water gates, canals, ditches, 
flumes, tunnels, pipelines and areas for setting up pumps and pumping 
machinery or other means of securing, storing, replacing and conveying water 
for domestic, culinary, industrial and irrigation purposes or for any necessary 
public use, or for drainage, upon payment of just compensation therefor, but 
such right of way shall in all cases be exercised in a manner not unnecessarily 
to impair the practical use of any other right of way, highway or public or 
private road, or to injure any public or private property. [Emphasis supplied]. 
Appellant Thayn maintains that the Court improperly interpreted the contract with a 
strict interpretation, which is both nonsensical to the public use of water and not within the 
intent of the parties as expressed therein. Moreover, the final ruling of the Court forces 
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Thayn into a position of conspiring with GRCC to take more water than it is legally entitled 
to or could reasonably utilize, before Thayn can receive even one drop of irrigation water. 
No evidence of actual intent of the parties was presented at the trial Court inasmuch as the 
actual signatories to the contract are long since deceased. However, Thayn attempted in his 
affidavits and memorandums to get the court to consider the parties course of conduct, to 
wit: the fact that Wilson, through dilapidated and inefficient equipment, had in fact obtained 
a 600 non-consumptive water right use and had utilized said water for the irrigation season 
to pump his 35 cfs consumptive use up to his 42 foot canal. 
What Thayn did by modernization and technology was to take the same water right 
use and make it efficient enough to pump the irrigation water with left over use for the 
generation of hydroelectric power and recoupment of his costs of renovating the pump house 
and the facilities. Such renovations included the renovation of the radial gates. This was a 
benefit to both parties as it gave them more control over the raceway and an ability to easily 
clean the raceway by means of sluicing. Thayn did, through his predecessor Wilson, apply 
to the State Engineer to utilize the non-consumptive use year round, but nothing in the record 
indicates there is any impediment to the wrater right of GRCC in the non-irrigation season 
inasmuch as their water right is only 20 cfs (again subject to duty) for stock watering during 
that time. The contract is, in fact, silent as to any additional water rights of Wilson or his 
successors. Thayn urged, and the trial court rejected consideration of the parties course of 
conduct in interpreting the contract. As stated in Willard Pease Oil and Gas Company v 
Pioneer Oil and Gas Company, 899 p.2d 766 (Ut. 1995) if a contract is ambiguous and the 
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The Supreme Court interprets contract terms in light of the reasonable expectation of 
the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, and nature and 
purpose of the contract. Pierce v Pierce, 994 P.2d 193 (Ut. 2000). It utterly inconceivable 
that the parties intention and purpose of this contract was to violate the law or to otherwise 
appropriate water in violation of the statutes of the State of Utah. Certainly there is nothing 
in the contract itself from which such an intent could be gleaned. 
When interpreting a contract, a Court must attempt to construe the contract so as to 
harmonize and give effect to all of its provisions. Dixon vPro Image Inc., 987 P.2d 48 (Ut. 
1999). Under the interpretation placed on the contract by Judge Bryner below, the word 
"needed" becomes surplusage. There is no test applied to the word. The 80 cfs would define 
what the parties were talking about and the word "needed" would irrelevant. Further, the 
language, "to be exclusively determined by said first party", is also meaningless surplusage. 
If the parties intended that GRCC would have the first 80 cfs and that Wilson Produce 
Company would then have the next 435 cfs, they would have simply said that. There would 
be no need to discuss priority of diversions and utilize such words as "needed" and "allotting 
to GRCC" some right to make a determination as to what was needed. GRCC would simply 
get the first 80. The interpretation placed upon the contract by the trial court below renders 
portions of the contract meaningless. 
The original signatories, unlike the trial court below, recognized the State Engineer 
would be the final arbiter as to their water rights. If a contract is written and it is not 
ambiguous, the parties intention is determined from the plain meaning of the contract. Dixon 
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best ascertained by looking to the course of conduct of the parties, certainly the language 
does not rise to the level of "plain and unmistakable". The interpretation placed upon this 
contract by the trial court is not only unnecessary as a matter of law, it is contrary to law. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed with respect to 
the interpretation of the contract rendering the trial on the issues of estoppel, waiver and 
latches moot. This Court should interpret the contract in accordance with common sense 
meanings and the flexibility necessary to allow the evolution of more efficient water right 
uses through the future. The contract should not be interpreted to discourage efficient uses 
of water, but to encourage more efficient uses of water. This is precisely what Thayn did in 
this case. His conduct should not only be condoned, it should be applauded. The conduct 
of GRCC, in attempting to improperly extort the profits from another persons sweat and 
labor in direct violation of the Utah water statutes is not only disingenuous, but intolerable. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THAYN HAD A DUTY TO 
DISCOVER THE "UNRECORDED" 52 AMENDMENT AND BINDING HIM 
TO SAID AMENDMENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO NOTICE WAS 
EVER PROVIDED TO HIM UNTIL AFTER THE HYDRO ELECTRIC 
PLANT HAD BEEN BUILT. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court specifically ruled in its memorandum 
decision "the Plaintiffs silence complained of by the Defendant did not constitute a 
relinquishment of the quantity and nature of the use limitations because the Plaintiff was 
under no legal duty to inform the Defendant of the existence of the 1952 agreement and 
amendment. The Court is persuaded that the Defendant bears the burden of discovering the 
encumbrances and limitations on the property and water rights he purchases and that burden 
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cannot be shifted to the Plaintiff. (R. 1395-1402, 96-97). In point of fact, Thayn never 
signed the contract. Thayn admitted he was the successor in interest to Wilson but his 
signature does not appear thereon. Contrary to the law applied by the court below, U.C.A. 
§ 73-3-18, with respect to water rights, provides in relevant part that: 
... prior to the issuance of a certificate of appropriation, rights claimed under 
applications for the appropriation of water may be transferred by instruments 
in writing. Such instruments, when acknowledged or proved and certified in 
the manner provided by law for the acknowledgment or proving of 
conveyances of real estate, may be filed in the office of the State Engineer, 
and shall from the time of filing in said office impart notice to all person to the 
contents thereof. Every assignment of an application which shall not be 
recorded as herein provided shall be void as against any subsequent assignees 
in good faith and for valuable consideration of the same application or any 
portion thereof where his own assignment shall be first duly recorded. 
If the Court rejects the interpretation under issue one (1) of this appeal, it necessarily 
follows that the Court is interpreting that Wilson somehow assigned a portion of his water 
rights to the benefit of GRCC. The burden would be upon the Plaintiff, GRCC, to show that 
it imparted notice of that assignment to Thayn. This is contrary to the legal ruling of the 
Court. As far as the Summary Judgment goes, it is elementary that at summary judgment 
a moving party must show both that there are not issues of material fact and that it is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. U.R.C.P. Rule 56(c). 
In the instant case there were, in fact, material issues of fact precluding summary 
judgment, to-wit: the potential defenses of estoppel, waiver and latches. The Court, 
however, fashioned a "conditional" summary judgment which ignored the disputed facts 
and purported to grant summary judgment on the condition that Thayn did not succeed in 
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one of his defenses. It is unlike the situation where one defense is ruled wholly inapplicable, 
or one count on the complaint is ruled to be established as a matter of law. Here, virtually 
all of the counts were subject to the potential defenses and Summary Judgment should not 
have been granted. 
More particularly, the Court erred as a matter of law in shifting the burden from the 
Plaintiff to show that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, to the Defendant to 
show that the Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Since there is no 
evidence in the record that the 52 amendment was ever recorded, how would Thayn ever 
learn of the existence of such an amendment? There is no evidence it was filed with the 
State Engineer's office. There is no evidence that it was filed in the County records (though 
there is slight evidence that the 52 agreement itself may have been recorded). In McGarry 
v Thompson, 114 Ut. 442, 201 P. 288 (1948) the Court held that an innocent purchaser for 
value without notice of previous assignment, who first records his assignment, takes 
preference over prior unrecorded assignments. As is noted in the facts section supra, the 
assignment from Wilson Produce Company to Thayn were of record. The Court itself found 
that Thayn did not have notice of the 52 amendment until August of 1992 (which is after the 
hydro electric facility went online) (R. 1657-1668, 1659 Finding of Fact #15). 
If, in fact, GRCC owed no duty to disclose the amendment to Thayn, same being 
unrecorded and unregistered with the State Engineer's office, how would Thayn ever learn 
of same? Similarly, the real estate recording statutes provide: U.C.A. § 57-3-103 provides: 
"Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
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subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for 
valuable consideration; and the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly 
recorded." 
Again, the duty is on he who wishes to assert an interest in land (or water rights) to 
record or be subject to having his document declared void. In the instant case, GRCC has 
not proved any recording with regard to the 52 amendment. 
It is anticipated that GRCC could argue that it recorded the 52 agreement, and the 52 
amendment is at least evidentiary value as to what the parties intended under paragraph 6 of 
the original agreement. Even accepting that argument, if GRCC is allowed to introduce 
extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the agreement, i.e. the 52 amendment, should not 
Thayn also be equally entitled to submit extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the 52 
agreement, to-wit: the parties course of conduct? Thayn contends that the Court misapplied 
the burdens of proof and imposed upon him an impossible duty to search the world over for 
an undisclosed, unrecorded, and secreted agreement held only in the hidden files of GRCC 
until after he had expended some $300,000 to renovate and remodel the pump house. Equity 
demands much more of GRCC than this. The Court should reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and find that the 52 amendment in unenforceable as against Thayn. Alternatively, the 
Court should remand the matter to the trial court for redetermination of the interpretation of 
the contract considering aU extrinsic evidence, including the 52 amendment, as well as the 
parties course of conduct in dealing with each other. 
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U.C.A. § 73-3-5, 8, and subject to judicial review of his actions. U.C.A. § 73-3-14. Water 
users must file proof of their appropriation for a beneficial use, or in areas where a general 
adjudication has occurred or is pending (such as here) may elect to file a statement of claim 
for determination by the State as to the nature and amount of beneficial use. U.C.A. § 73-3-
16). 
Thereafter, the successful user receives a certificate of appropriation, in quantity of 
flow and/or acre-feet (depending on the use) which is prima facie evidence of the water 
rights. U.C.A. All users are required to construct and install measuring devises to measure 
the use of their water. U.C.A. § 73-5-4.5 
There is no right of adverse possession to water, U.C.A. §73-3-1 and priorities of use 
are determined by the date of first use, except that in times of scarcity when the better use 
has priority. (U.C.A. § 73-3-21. 
Failure to utilize water for a five year period causes loss of the right. U.C.A. §73-1 -4. 
It was argued below by GRCC (successfully) that the 52 Agreement and Amendment must 
be enforced and an injunction must issue because GRCC had a "constitutional right to 
exclude others" from the use of their facilities. (R. 1899, p. 89); See also oral arguments at 
Summary Judgment 1905). No authority was ever cited for this premise! 
Thayn maintains, based upon the foregoing, that the interpretation placed upon the 
contract in this case, coupled with denial of his statutory right of eminent domain, violates 
public policy and that the remedy of injunction should not have been imposed. 
5
 GRCC has no measuring devises on its canal or the raceway. (R. 1899). 
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First, the lower Court has granted to GRCC a right of use in its canal 80 cfs (without 
duty) and with priority over Thayn's established beneficial uses, over and above that to 
which the no State authorized. This violates both the "need" provision of the contract and 
the overwhelming policy against water waste in this State. 
Secondly, without any showing whatsoever of beneficial use by GRCC, Thayn's clear 
and unequivocal beneficial use of generating electricity is curtailed, and lost. This is 
egregiously apparent in the offseason (non-irrigation season) during which GRCC has only 
a 20 cfs stock maximum flow watering right and there is no dispute in the record that Thayn 
could utilize water to generate electricity at such times without even a question of 
impairment to GRCC. 
Nevertheless, the order of the trial court below prohibits same. Why does the Court 
below allow the water to flow out of State and be appropriated for use by junior water right 
holders in another State? What possible benefit is that to the citizens of this state? 
The reason, of course, is that GRCC desires to extort from Thayn not the measure of 
any damages to it, as there are no such provable damages, but the profits of Thayn's hard 
work, ingenuity, industriousness and capital investment. 
Third, the trial court below, although it expressly stated it was not adjudicating water 
rights, in fact did! The judgment of the Court states "The Canal Company has the right to 
use the first 80 cfs diverted through the canal diversion facilities during the irrigation season 
and the first 20 cfs during the non-irrigation season." (R. 1670, % 3). 
The Court went on to enforce the mystical "right to exclude" claimed by GRCC to 
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exclude Thayn from any hydro- electric power sale whatsoever without the express consent 
of GRCC. {Id at para. 5.) 
This was done without joining the State Engineer as a defendant as provided for in 
U.C.A. § 73-3-14. In essence GRCC has obtained a water right through the back door for 
80 cfs that it never could lawfully obtain from the State Engineer. 
Fourth, that to the extent GRCC has obtained a priority of 80 cfs over and above 
Thayn, and over and above GRCC's State approved water right the Judgment violates the 
public policy against waste, and is beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant without 
joining the State Engineer as a party.6 
Finally, Thayn attacks the preliminary injunction as a remedy. An injunction cannot 
be used to violate criminal statues. Literally, unless Thayn cooperates in GRCC's taking 
water illegally, Thayn doesn't even get his irrigation water. Until GRCC gets 20 cfs of water 
over and above its State approved water right, in violation of law, (a misdemeanor for every 
day of the offense), Thayn gets not one drop of water. Moreover, without any duty 
limitation by the court, GRCC is granted unfettered and unlimited acre foot priority over 
Thayn. 
Additionally, GRCC argued below that Thayn promised to share in the profits, "as 
agreed previously " if the hydro-electric plant was constructed. (R.E. 98, minutes of 1/7/92). 
The only agreement which the parties could have been talking about was the National Hydro 
6
 This argument was not raised below because the Court assured the parties it was not 
adjudicating water rights, then did. 
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contract under which GRCC would be entitled to one percent of the gross revenues over and 
above the first 863,500 KWH (i.e. the irrigation pumping needs of Thayn). Accordingly, 
GRCC had an adequate remedy at law, i.e. suit on that oral promise. GRCC chose not to 
pursue that, but rather pursued some undefined claim for gross revenues. A party cannot 
simply ignore its contract remedy for damages as a basis to say it has no adequate remedy 
at law. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed as void against public 
policy. Alternatively, the matter should be reversed and rewarded to ascertain the damages 
against Thayn under the "oral promise to share revenues as previously agreed" and the 
injunctive relief denied. 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THAYN FROM HIS STATUTORY 
RIGHTS UNDER U.C.A. § 73-1-6 AND 7 INSOFAR AS BOTH VOLUME AND 
POWER GENERATION FOR SALE IS CONCERNED. 
The Court below held Thayn was not entitled to utilize eminant domain inasmuch os 
the agreements were enforceable. U.C.A. § 73-1-7 entitled "Enlargement for Joint Use of 
Ditch" provides as follows: 
When any person desires to convey water for irrigation or any other beneficial 
purpose and there is a canal or ditch already constructed that can be used or 
enlarged to convey the required quantity of water, such person shall have the 
right to use or enlarge such canal or ditch already constructed, by 
compensating the owner of the canal or ditch to be used or enlarged for the 
damage caused by such use or enlargement and by paying an equitable 
proportion of the maintenance of the canal or ditch jointly used or enlarged; 
provided that such enlargement shall be made between the first day of October 
and the first day of March, or at any other time may be agreed upon with the 
owner of such canal or ditch. The additional water turned in shall bear its 
proportion of loss by evaporation and seepage. [Emphasis added] 
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Further, U.C.A. § 73-1-6 provides a right-a-way across public, private and corporate 
lands for the construction, maintenance and repair of any such facilities including for 
industrial and irrigation purposes. The trial court in this case not only prohibited Thayn from 
its eminent domain rights as provided by statute, but also entered an order against him 
prohibiting him from having his right of way access to maintain or repair the raceway even 
in the absence of GRCC's unwillingness to do so. (R. 497-498). Again, the argument of 
GRCC was it's nebulous "right to exclude". Further, GRCC maintained that because there 
was an agreement with Wilson that Thayn had no statutory right of eminent domain. 
Thayn contends this is error in two (2) points. First, the case law cited by GRCC is 
case law under U.C.A. § 73-1-9 which addresses the issue of how maintenance costs should 
be apportioned. Case law under that statute holds that where there is an express agreement 
between the parties U.C.A. § 73-1-9 is inapplicable. See, e.q. Gunnison-Fayett Canal Co. 
v Roberts, supra (and cases cited therein in footnote 1 p. 105). Based upon that line of 
reasoning, the Court held there was no right of eminent domain applicable to Thayn. (R. 
242-244). In Peterson v Severe Valley Canal Company, 107 Ut. 45, 151 P.2d 477 (1944) 
the Court held as follows: 
If the parties can agree on the joint use of the ditch, condemnation is not 
necessary. In that event, if the parties agree on the amount to be paid for the 
use, or the basis for determination of the amount, the contract controls. If, 
however, the parties cannot agree on the price to be paid for the use, the ditch 
owner can close the ditch against the other parties water until he gets his price, 
but the party who desires to use may exercise the right of eminent domain to 
acquire such use. 
Whatever this court interprets the agreement to have been in 1952 between GRCC 
39 
and Wilson, and even if this Court interprets that contract is binding on Thayn as successor 
in interest, nevertheless, a new use has come upon the scene. A use of hydroelectric power 
by means of modern technology and efficiency in the pumping of the irrigation water. That 
use extends not just for the irrigation season, but for the entire year. As to the new use, the 
parties have not agreed. This lawsuit is abundant evidence of that. The injunction and 
restraining order that the Plaintiff sought shows the parties don't agree. The water right for 
600 cfs non-consumptive all year round which was approved by the State Engineer is not the 
water right specified under the 52 or amendment. The new use carries with it a right of 
eminent domain. The Court was in error to deny a right of eminent domain for the new use. 
In its equitable powers, the Court may well have found that the old formula for costs and 
maintenance, i.e. 50% to each party, was no longer equitable. The Court may well have 
imposed a pro rata share of the costs and maintenance upon Thayn, by reason of the alleged 
use to which Thayn sought to employ. 
To hold, as did the trial court in this case, that a contract for one use forever and ever 
precludes any future uses, enlarged uses, or changed uses is to narrow the scope of §7 3-1-7 
beyond the intent of the plain meaning of the statute. In fact, the statute specifically 
anticipates "additional water". As to the "additional water" here, there is no agreement and 
Thayn should have its statutory right of eminent domain. A review of the cases cited by 
GRCC below shows that the Court therein was attempting to resolve issues wherein the 
contribution as to ditch maintenance had already been agreed upon, but one or more parties 
to the contract sought to impose the pro rata formula as opposed to the agreement. Such is 
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not the case here. 
Thayn has a beneficial use for the generation of hydro electricity which was never 
anticipated under the 52 ammendment. It is true that Thayn's predecessor was using power 
to pump water but same was mechanical power, not hydro electric power. By use of modern 
and efficient means, Thayn's power needs to pump water have been reduced and excess 
water energy can be utilized for hydro electric purposes. As to this use, there was no 
agreement and U.C.A. § 73-1-7 controls. 
In interpreting the statute, the Supreme Court should ask itself did the legislature 
intend for parties who have an existing contract, to be forever precluded from the benefits 
of modernization and new technology? For example, assume parties have a joint ditch 
sharing agreement in place. For 60 years water has meandered through an earthen ditch with 
seepage and evaporation losses to both parties. One party now seeks to enlarge the ditch to 
accommodate a pipeline to prevent seepage and loss of water for his irrigation water and 
allow same to be pumped at higher pressure, more regulated volume, and greater efficiency. 
Under the interpretation placed upon the statute by Judge Bryner below, that party can never 
do so because there is in place an existing agreement as to how they will share the ditch. Just 
because parties in the early 1900s entered into agreements and contracts of accommodation 
with each other to utilize water according to the technology of their day, should modern day 
successors in interest be forever barred from renovating and industrializing? Should they 
be trapped in the obsolete technology of third world countries forever? Was that the 
legislative intent? 
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Thayn propounds it was not. Rather the statute should be interpreted in terms of 
common sense reasoning and flexibility to encourage, not prohibit, modernization. This is 
especially true with respect to something as scarce as water. The more efficiently it is used, 
the more water there is for everyone. Remember, this is public water, not private water. 
The State is the steward over that water and any private party's rights to utilize same is 
conditional. As a matter of good public policy, the Supreme Court should hold that eminent 
domain lies whenever a new or expanded use of the water, or even a more efficient 
technological use of the water, is proposed by one party to the contract and the other party 
to the contract will not agree. Anything less forever imprisons parties whose predecessors 
in interest may have amicably resolved their joint ditch or canal sharing in the past, and 
relegates them to only obsolete technology forever and ever7. The Supreme Court should 
reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand the matter for proceedings under the eminent 
domain statutes. Upon such remand the Court should instruct the trial court as to how to 
apportion the maintenance costs and for a determination of damages, if any, by the hydro 
electric use of Thayn. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR 
DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHEREIN 
GRCC WAS BUILDING AN OBSTRUCTION WALL TO IMPEDE THAYN'S 
WATER IN THE CANAL DURING THE COURSE OF THIS ACTION, 
WHICH CONDUCT WAS IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 73-1-15. 
7
 Ironically, while GRCC herein argued there can be no enlargment of future uses by 
Thayn, the 52 agreement itself specifically anticipated increased future use under the cost 
sharing provisions. 
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U.C.A. § 73-1-15 provides in relevant part: 
Whenever any person, partnership, company or corporation has a right of way 
of any established type or title for any canal or other water course it shall be 
unlawful for any person, persons or governmental agencies to place or 
maintain in place any obstruction, or change of the water flow by fence or 
otherwise, along or across or in such canal or watercourse.... That the vested 
rights in established canals and watercourses shall be protected against all 
encroachments...Any person, partnership, company or corporation violating 
the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to 
damages and costs. 
When GRCC began building the 40 foot wall extending out from its canal into the 
raceway and blocking the water flow to Thayn's pump house, Thayn applied for and 
received a temporary restraining order on March 15, 1999, (R. 540-542). Thereafter a 
hearing was held on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which injunction was denied due 
to the failure to have an underlying claim in the Thayn's pleadings and because the Court 
ruled there was no irreparable injury, money damages could be awarded. (R. 621-627). 
Thereafter the Court awarded attorney's fees of $7,518.50 and no costs for GRCC's 
resistance of the preliminary injunction, and $1,614.00 and $734.00 in costs on appeal for 
resisting the application of Thayn for preliminary injunction on appeal on November 27, 
2000. (R. 1624-1625). 
The conduct of GRCC in attempting to obstruct water flow to Thayn was clearly 
culpable and in violation of law under the above set forth statute. Nevertheless, no 
preliminary injunction was issued. U.R.C.P. Rule 65A(c)(2) provides: 
The amount of security shall not or establish or limit the amount of costs, 
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred in connection with the 
restraining order or preliminary injunction, or damages that may be awarded 
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to a party who is found to have been wrongfully restrained or enjoined. 
In the present case, the attorney's fees were all expended in resisting an application 
for preliminary injunction, and not for wrongful injunction. (See Affidavit of David 
Hartvigsen In Support of Application for Attorney's Fees, (R. 733). Although a temporary 
restraining order was issued, no motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order was made 
as is provided for under U.R.C.P. 65A(b)(4) and it lapsed of its own accord. Rather the 
efforts of GRCC were fully devoted to resisting issuance of a preliminary injunction, which 
efforts were successful. In Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., vAtkin, Wright & Miles, Chtd., 
681 P.2d 1258 (Ut. 1984) the Utah Supreme Court has held that "if it's found that the 
injunction was wrongfully issued, the enjoined party has an action for costs and damages as 
a result of the wrongfully issued injunction", (id 1262). Moreover, in Tholen v Sandy City, 
849 P.2d 592 (Ut. App. 1993), Tholen Court held that wrongfully enjoined parties "are only 
entitled to fees...incurred in defending against wrongfully obtained injunctive relief, and not 
to fees incurred in litigation in the underlying lawsuit associated with the injunction", (id 
597). In the present case, no injunction was issued and the attorney's fees, both at the trial 
court level and at the Supreme Court level, were incurred in attempting to obtain an 
injunction and not in wrongfully enjoining a party. While attorney's fees directly related to 
the dissolution of a wrongful injunction are recoverable, Artistic Hairdressers Inc. v Levy, 
486 P.2d 482,484 (Nev. 1971 )(cited with approval in Saunders v Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 Utah 
App. 1990), there is no Utah appellate case of record showing that one successfully resisting 
the issuance of an injunction is entitled to his attorney's fees. While the policy and purpose 
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of Rule 65A may well be to uup the ante" for those obtaining a restraining order or an 
injunction, neither the Rule nor the case law provide for attorney fees in those situations 
where an injunction is not obtained. It is elementary that Utah follows the American rule 
with regard to attorney's fees, and attorney's fees are not awarded unless provided for in the 
contract or by statute. While Rule 65A(c)(2) does refer to attorney's fees "in connection 
with" a restraining order or preliminary injunction, said fees may only be awarded, "to a 
party who is found to have been wrongfully restrained or enjoined". All of the attorney's 
fees and costs incurred and awarded to GRCC were attorney's fees expended in resisting a 
preliminary injunction. They were not so enjoined. Accordingly, the award of attorney's 
fees and costs should be reversed. The order of the Court below awarding attorney fees to 
GRCC adds insult to injury where, as here, the conduct sought to be enjoined is itself a 
criminal action. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE STANDARDS OF 
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER AND LATCHES AND IN CONCLUDING THAT 
GRCC HAD NO DUTY TO PROTEST THAYN'S WATER FILING IF GRCC 
INTENDED TO RELY ON ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 52 
AMENDMENT. 
a: Burden of Proof 
Thayn maintains that the Court erred below in applying a clear and convincing 
evidence standard under estoppel. This is a question of first impression to the Supreme 
Court. GRCC argued below that a majority of courts have applied a clear and convincing 
evidence standard to estoppel. A review of the cases cited by GRCC does not show that a 
majority of the jurisdictions have so ruled. While there are a number of courts that do in fact 
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apply the clear and convincing evidence standard to estoppel, Utah has never so ruled. 
When faced with the issue on waiver, the Court in Soter's Inc. v Desert Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935 declined to impose a clear and convincing evidence standard on the 
issue of waiver. Thayn maintains as a matter of law there is no just reason for imposing a 
higher burden of proof on estoppel than any other equitable defense, or equitable action. 
What policy is served by affording an equitable right, such as an injunction by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and then imposing on an equitable defense, such as estoppel, 
a higher burden of proof? It is true that fraud has historically required clear and convincing 
evidence due to the nature of the action requiring a misrepresentation. Estoppel, on the other 
hand, is only a defense and is imparted in those actions where, in justified reliance on a 
party's word, conduct or inaction, a person changes his position to his detriment. Estoppel 
is there to prevent a wrongdoer from obtaining an unjust benefit by virtue of his own 
conduct. It is not similar to fraud where one seek to recover damages or undo a transaction 
already complete. This Court should hold the burden of proof is preponderance of the 
evidence standard and not the clear and convincing evidence standard. 
(b) The trial court's conclusions are non-sequitur to its findings. In its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law the Court held that the standard of proof in an estoppel case is clear 
and convincing evidence (R. 1665 \ 23). The Court further held that "because Mr. Thayn 
did not inform an intent to proceed with the commercial hydro electric project until July of 
1990, the conduct of the parties prior to that date is irrelevant to the issue of estoppel", {id. 
\ 24). Such conclusion is non-sequitur from the findings. It is precisely because the canal 
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company did not protest the water filing of Wilson, under which the State Engineer 
determined Wilson was utilizing 600 cfs and not the previously applied for 400 cfs and the 
subsequent water filing in 1981 by Wilson to change the 600 cfs approved water right to a 
year round water right that induced Thayn to even consider the possibility of hydro electric 
generation. Unquestionably, by the time of the National Hydro project, the issue of Thayn 
and Wilson's prior claimed use of the water had been brought to the forefront of the canal 
company. The water rights already established were part and parcel of the contract regarding 
the proposed National Hydro project i.e. the pumping needs of Thayn to which the National 
Hydro contract purported to exclude any royalty payment for. The canal companies utter 
silence and non-protest of the water rights would induce any reasonable person to believe 
that there was no issue with regard to the 600 cfs. Mr. Thayn would not proceed to invest 
$300,000 into a hydro electric plant if there were an issue as to his use of the 600 cfs. For 
the Court to rule that any conduct prior to Thayn's forming an intent to invest the money into 
the hydro electric plant was irrelevant is simply absurd and illogical. Parties do not make 
a decision in a vacuum. It was the perfected water rights upon which Thayn believed there 
was no issue and no question that he sought to make use of. 
Moreover, the Court ruled that Mr. Thayn's pre-1992 actual water use did not impart 
any notice to the canal company that Thayn intended to divert more than 435 cfs through the 
raceway in contravention of the 1952 agreements. (R. 1666 f^ 30). In actual fact, it is the 
canal company's egregious violation of 73-5-4 by not installing any measuring devices 
which, even if you take the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, results in its lack 
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of knowledge of the amount of water being used. However, as of the publication of notice 
to water users in 1982 (R. 53), the canal company is charged with notice by virtue of the 
posting of the water right application. Said notice specifies that the 600 second feet of water 
would be diverted as set forth in the application through the raceway. Ten (10) years follow 
and still no objection to Thayn regarding utilizing 600 cfs in the raceway. These conclusions 
are error as a matter of law. They simply do not follow from the facts as found by the Court. 
In paragraph 28 of its conclusions, the Court finds that the minutes of the canal 
company do not evidence any awareness by the canal company that Thayn intended to use 
the 600 cfs for commercial power generation. First, how he used the cfs was really none of 
the canal companies business. It is the quantity, not the particular use, to which the canal 
company may have any objection. Whether he intends to use his water for irrigation 
pumping or commercial power generation is irrelevant, or should be, to the canal company. 
Of course, if the canal companies real motivations are to attempt to extort profits from a joint 
ditch user, they might well be concerned as to how valuable the use of the water is. If the 
canal company is simply concerned about receiving its own water, their only concern should 
be the amount of water flowing through the diversion facilities. It doesn't take a rocket 
scientist to know what the true motivations of the canal company are in this case. 
For example, the testimony of David Hansen, Thayn's expert witness at the contempt 
hearing (R. 1901, pp. 145-146), was that there was plenty of water to satisfy all of the parties 
needs and that the raceway could accommodate the entire 800 cfs without problem. Hansen 
further noted that there was between 5 and 10 cfs flow being lost through the upper sluice 
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gates which the canal company had not fixed (R. 1901, pp. 148-150). His testimony was that 
there was three (3) feet of silt in the bottom of GRCC's canal and an inverted siphon which 
were restricting its own flow. This is failure of the canal company to maintain its own ditch 
utilized as an excuse to attempt to extort profits from Thayn. 
The Court further found that Mr. Thayn first learned of the 52 amendment in 1992, 
(after the hydro electric plant was online) when being questioned by the canal company 
about his commercial hydro electric plant. (R. 1660 ^ 15). 
The Court also concluded that the 1981 newspaper article in the Sun Advocate about 
the hydro electric project was too vague and general in nature to give any notice of any intent 
to build the present hydroelectric project. 
These conclusions simply do not follow from the facts. There is no question that the 
canal company members, including board members were well aware of, (or are charged with 
notice by virtue of the water right filing) that Thayn was utilizing 600 cfs. Allowing, even 
in the best light, 15 years of utter silence, by the canal company and then imposing a duty 
upon Thayn to discover an unrecorded 52 amendment to the contract which apparently the 
canal company had in its records and, for no reason whatsoever, never disclosed or discussed 
with Thayn as a basis to now preclude him is unquestionably aprima facia case of estoppel. 
See and compare Ceco Corp. v Concrete Specialties Inc. 772 P.2d 967, 969-970 (Ut. 1989) 
also Utah State Building Comm 'n v Great American Indemnity Company, 105 Ut. 11, 140 
P.2d 762, 771-72 (1943) (inaction or silence may amount to an estoppel where a party 
remains silent when there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where there is "something 
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wilful or culpable in the silence which allows another to place himself in an unfavorable 
position by the reason thereof. 
At a minimum, the elements of waiver and latches were established, even if you 
accept the factual findings of the trial court as valid. Becks tead v Deseret Roofing Co. Inc., 
831 P.2d 130 (Ut. App. 1992) "waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a 
known right and the failure to adhere to the precise terms of a contract, combined with the 
absence of notice of a party's intention to insist on strict compliance, is enough evidence to 
support a finding of waiver". Airoulofski v State 1992 P.2d 889 (Ala. 1996)"implied waiver 
occurs when the neglect to insist on a right is such that it would convey a message to a 
reasonable person that the neglectful party would not in the future pursue the legal right in 
question". Doit Inc. v Touche Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Ut. 1996) "latches is present when 
a Plaintiff seeking equity unreasonably delays in bringing an action and this delay prejudices 
the Defendant". Latches is an equitable doctrine based on the maxim that equity aids the 
vigilante, not those who slumber on their rights. Nilson-Newey & Co. v Utah Resources 
Int'l, 905P.2d312. 
VIL THE COURT ERRED GRANTING GRCC'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN PRECLUDING EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
REGARDING MAINTENANCE ISSUES, WHILE ALLOWING GRCC TO 
ATTEST IT WAS NOT GETTING ITS WATER. 
The Court at trial ruled that because the issue of lack of maintenance was not raised 
as an affirmative defense prior to the original Summary Judgment ruling, it could not now 
be raised at trial. (R. 81-85.) Defense Counsel argued both that it was an additional element 
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of the estoppel theory and direct rebuttal to their claim that Thayn was preventing GRCC 
from getting its full 80 cfs. (R. 84.) The Court nevertheless denied admission of the 
evidence as irrelevant to the issue of estoppel. (R. 86.) 
However, GRCC was allowed to put on evidence it was not getting its full 80 cfs, 
(Vetere testimony, R. 1902 v. I, p.220). GRCC's Second Supplemental Complaint alleges 
it should have declaratory relief because commencing in 1996 GRCC became aware it was 
not receiving its full 80 cfs of water and Thayn refused to turn off his turbines. (R. 271, 
para. 42-43.) This was denied by Thayn in Answer and specifically raised GRCC's failure 
to maintain the raceway and diversion facilities. (R. 258,^} 15.) It was further raised by Lee 
Thayn in his Affidavit in Opposition to GRCC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
its eighth and ninth courses of action. Thayn attested that: 
They have wholly failed to properly maintain the dam and diversion 
works as required by the 1952 agreement so that the rate of flow to sustain the 
needs of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant could be satisfied. Specifically, 
they have refused despite my repeated requests, to close the gates on the West 
end of the dam to permit an increase of flow into the raceway. In fact, they 
have locked them open. . . . More importantly, they have refused, in spite of 
my urgent requests to clean out the raceway, so more water could reach the 
power house and the head of Plaintiff s canal. In fact, they have refused my 
repeated requests that I be permitted to clean out the raceway at my own 
considerable expense. (R. 465.) 
Thayn's position on this issue is simple. Either the trial court erred in granting the 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment over the issue of whether GRCC was properly 
maintaining the facilities, or it erred in not admitting the maintenance issues at trial. 
If the Court considered the question of maintenance to be part and parcel of the 
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estoppel, waiver and latches issues, then the partial summary judgment was proper. In ruling 
on a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court may consider only facts that are not in 
dispute, Sorenson v Beers, 585 P.2d 458 (Ut. App. 1978.) Accordingly, Thayn was entitled 
to proceed with the maintenance issues at trial and it was an abuse of discretion to exclude 
such testimony. 
If the Court in fact believed the maintenance issues had no relevancy to the estoppel, 
waiver and latches theory, the ruling at trial may be upheld, but the summary judgment was 
improper. 
GRCC cannot have its cake and eat it, too. Thayn was entitled, somewhere, to have 
his day in Court on the maintenance issues. 
The Court should reverse and remand for new trial either on the error of granting 
partial summary judgment or for excluding evidence of failure to maintain the facilities from 
the trial. 
VIII. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT AGAINST THE CLEAR 
AND UNDISPUTABLE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial court found that the canal company did not intend to relinquish either the quantity 
of nature of use limitations of the 1952 agreements and that it did not make a distinct relinquishment 
of the quantity or nature of use limitations. (R. 1661 fflj 21-22). The trial court further found the 
canal company did not know, nor should have known, that Mr. Thayn was unaware of the 52 
agreements prior to August of 1992. (R. 1621 ^  23). The trial court further found that Mr. Thayn 
did not suffer any injury as a lack of diligence on the canal company. (R. id. at ^  25). The trial court 
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further found that, although some of the canal company's board members knew that Mr. Thayn was 
renovating his facilities and the generators were being delivered to the pump house, they were not 
aware he was going to generate power for sale until spring of 1992 when Thayn began generating 
commercial power and using more water. (R. 1662, f^ 27). 
Finally, the trial court found that neither Mr. Thayn nor anyone else informed the canal 
company prior to April of 1992 that Mr. Thayn was going to generate commercial power as a part 
of the pump house facilities renovation and upgrade project, {id. at f 28). Thayn maintains that 
these conclusions are not supported by the evidence as a matter of law and are clearly erroneous. 
In marshaling the evidence, the evidence at trial discloses the following: 
At trial Thayn first called Clinton Thompson, GRCC 's ditch rider from 1987 to 1989, 
who testified he observed the construction occurring at the pump house and knew Thayn was 
putting in electrical generating facilities. (R. 1902, V.I. p. 31). He further testified he had 
a conversation with Jack Erwin about the raceway that it needed to be cleaned out and 
growth of shrubs cut back (R. 1902, V. I., p. 34-35). He further noted the dam needed repair. 
(R. 1902, V. I., p. 35). 
Dean King, GRCC board member for 18 years until 1988, attested he wasn't sure if 
he knew about Wilson', 1974 application for a 600 cfs water right. (R. 1902, V.I., p.45) but 
did know Wilson was diverting water year round since 1981. (R. 1902 V.I., p. 45). King 
attested that he, Tim Vetere, Jack Erwin, Blaine Silliman and Bill Cache were the members 
of GRCC who negotiated on the National Hydro contract. (R. 1902, V.I., p. 47). The 
National Hydro contract was to pay GRCC 1% of the gross revenues for 15 years and 2% 
thereafter, except the first 863,500 KWH representing Thayn's pumping needs, {id. at 49). 
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King was aware GRCC did not protest Wilson's application for 600 cfs in 1974. Further that 
he didn't have a problem with Wilson"s application to increase from 400 to 600 cfs because 
it was Wilson, Not Thayns. (R. id. at 52). He did it for Wilson because he was one of the 
"good ole boys", (id.). GRCC didn't have a problem with Wilson having 600 cfs 
or they would have objected, (id. 55). 
King acknowledged he knew from the size of the pump house renovation that it 
would be used to generate electricity. (R. 1902 V.I., p. 96). King specifically acknowledged 
Thayn's requesting GRCC clean its canal and the raceway and that GRCC never did it. (R. 
1902, V.L, p. 12). King further acknowledged Thayn addressing the 600 cfs non-
consumptive going through the pump house back to the river, (id. 12). 
Thayn presented Kenneth Stillman, Mayor of Green River City and GRCC board 
member beginning in 1989. He was also vice-president of GRCC from 1991-1993. (R. 
1902, V.L. p. 127). He had originally protested Wilson's 1981 600 cfs change filing on 
behalf of the city, but later withdrew that protest, (id. at 130). GRCC did not protest that 
filing, (id.) Further, GRCC had no measuring devices on its property, (id. at 131).8 
Stillman was aware Thayn intended to generate power for sale on a commercial basis 
(id. at 132), that Wilson's old pumping equipment was in disrepair and wasting water, (id. 
at 134), and that the sluice gates were in "tough shape", (id. at 136). The raceway had 
branches and stuff hanging into it. (id.). Stillman specifically recalled a 3/14/89 GRCC 
board meeting discussion of Thayn's proposed hydroelectric plant being discusses, (id. at 
8Mcasuring devices are required by U.C.A. § 73-5-4. 
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139). Stillman said that Leon Thayn represented that if power was generated, GRCC would 
receive a royalty, (id. at 141). 
Olive Anderson, Green River City Councilwoman and GRCC shareholder attested 
she knew of Thayn's intent to sell power to U. P. & L, that the city wanted to buy direct, and 
that it was talked about around town. (R. 1902, V.I., 155-158). 
Bernard Lassen, GRCC shareholder, knew of Thayn's plans to sell power, he had no 
water problems, and attested that anyone who drove up the road by the pump house could 
see the transformers sitting outside the pump house prior to their installation in 1990. (R. 
1902,V.I.,p. 162-171). 
Odell Anderson, local resident, attested it was common knowledge Thayn was going 
to pump water and generate el4ectricity before, during and after the project was being built. 
(R. 1902, V.I.,pp. 182-193). This was confirmed by Robert Seely, GRCC shareholder, (id. 
200-203). 
Tim Vetere, current board member, was called. Vetere was elected to GRCC's board 
in 1991 and claimed that since 1992 there had been numerous problems getting water, that 
the amount of the water would fluctuate. (R. id. at 220). Vetere acknowledged that he had 
gone to the pump house in 1989 and talked with Leon Thayn who told him they were putting 
generators in to generate power, (id. at 223). Vetere was vice-president of GRCC at that 
time and was aware Thayn was going to sell power, (id. at 224). His understanding was that 
there was an agreement with the canal company regarding the generation of power for sale. 
(id. at 228). 
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Leon Thayn was called and testified that he was originally a partner with Lee when 
they bought the Wilson farm. (R. 1902, V.2, p. 11). He and Lee obtained copies of the 
water filings and verified the water rights prior to purchase, {id. at 12-13). The records were 
very clear and documented as 600 cfs non-consumptive use for power and 35 cfs 
consumptive use for irrigation, {id. p. 15). They relied on the water right in order to 
purchase the property, {id. at 16). The condition of the equipment was very poor. {id. at 16-
19). The pumping equipment was in such disrepair that they had to run both turbines of 
water continuously during the irrigation season in order to pump water, {id. at 33). He and 
Lee determined it would have to be rebuilt {id. at 39-40). 
Leon was contacted by National Hydro who recommended it as a site for power 
generation and was working with the canal company at the time. {id. at 49). He became 
aware of the 52 agreement when he saw the application presented to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission by National Hydro, {id. at 50). He first learned of the 52 
amendment in a meeting with GRCC in 1992. {id.). They signed an agreement with U. P. 
& L. in late 1990 or early 1991 and began delivering power on April 2, 1992. {id. at 51). 
They took out a loan to finance the project with a credit limit of $250,000, Thayn ranch and 
Rick Kaster both signed on the loan, with the equipment itself as security for the loan, {id.) 
Thayn also pledged some of the farm equipment as additional security, (id.) 
It was no secret they intended to generate electricity, in fact, there was an article in 
the Sun Advocate about a local farmer wanting to develop a power project, {id. at 52). There 
was no copy of the52 amendment included in the National Hydro FERC application, {id. at 
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55). National Hydro proposed a 5,000 cfs water consumptive right including the 600 of 
Thayns. (id.) Leon was present when the National Hydro contract was executed, and a copy 
was given to the canal company, (id. at 57). GRCC never objected to the fact that Thayns 
were reserving 600 cfs out of the royalty proceeds for their pumping; there was never an 
objection to it prior to 1992. (id. at 58). 
Thayns relied upon the 600 cfs power right in order to go forward with the generation 
project, (id. at 60). The whole purpose was to produce enough power to pay to pay for the 
improvements and expenses necessary to do the repairs, (id.) National Hydro decided not 
to go forward because Fish and Wildlife would not approve the project, (id. at 61). Thayns 
decided to go forward with some of the project, and a study was done to see if the smaller 
scale project could be accommodated by Fish and Wildlife, (id. at 64-66). Thayns would 
have to flush the raceway channel out at least twice a month by closing the gates to their 
turbines and opening the radial gates, taking about 8 hours to flush the sand and silt out of 
the channel, (id. at 68). Leon even offered to clean the raceway out at his own expense but 
was not allowed to. (id. at 78). He attended a June 24, 1992 board meeting and told the 
board they had a 600 cfs for non-consumptive use. No objection was raised by the board at 
that time. (id. at 80). 
On August 4, 1992, they had another meeting wherein GRCC said it only recognized 
435 not 600; Thayn learned of the 52 amendment at that time. (id. at 82-83). The list of 
expenses and costs to do the co-generation project totaled some $355,000. (id. at 101). Leon 
denied ever telling Vetere or Mr. King that the power would only be for pumping. (R. 1902, 
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V.IIL, pp. 5-6). There were visitors to the site including tours from SCS and CED in 1990. 
They had met with GRCC on January 15, 1982 and March 13, 1982 as well as September 
29, 1982 after taking over operation on the Wilson farm. (id. at 56). Those meetings were 
for the purpose of the National Hydro project which proposed some 4,100 cfs in addition to 
Thayn's 600 cfs. (id. at 63). The original raceway was designed to carry 1,000 cubic feet per 
second, (id. at 64). He didn't know if the canal company was ever given written notice, but 
that they did receive verbal notice that the National Hydro project did not go through and 
that Thayns intended to do the current project, (id. at 65-66). In 1989 they received approval 
from FERC to allow them to do the co-generation project, (id. at 76). At that time they still 
were concerned about funding the project, (id. at 83). 
The new project started around the summer of 1990 when they bought the first 
equipment and decided to do the project one stage at a time so as to not interrupt the 
irrigation water for farming to Thayn's ranch, (id. at 90-98). They hired Rick Kaster to work 
on the improvements of the building in 1989. (zW. at 125). Leon is a 25% owner in the power 
plant itself, along with Mr. Kaster and Lee. (id. at 132). In 1990 they found some used 
equipment which would meet the needs of their plant and obtained financing to proceed, (id. 
at 143). 
Rick Kaster testified that he did the actual reconstruction and power plant building 
work. (id. at 176-180). He understood Thayns had a 600 non-consumptive use which was 
a factor in his interest in doing the project, (id. at 182). He signed on the loan at Zions with 
Lee and Leon. ( R. 1902, V. IV, p. 6). There were a lot of visitors from 1990-1992 and no 
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one was ever denied the opportunity to go through the plant if they wanted to. (id. at 9). 
Rick owns 50% of the surplus energy over and above that required for Lee's pumping of 
irrigation, (id. at 30). He would not have gone forward with the project if there had been any 
doubt about the 600 cfs that they had. (id. at 82). He had met with the canal company and 
had never turned down a request to meet with them. (id.). 
Lee and Leon dissolved their partnership in the farm in 1993 due to Leon's 
retirement, (id. at 98). All three (3) were still partners in the co-generation project, (id.). 
Rick had told Blaine Stillman, Bruce Nelson and Gary Eckhert that they were going to 
generate power for sale. (id. at 122). 
Leon Thayn was again re-examined regarding the meeting of 3/14/89 with GRCC 
wherein he said GRCC would be sharing power as previously agreed. The only agreement 
he was aware of was the National Hydro contract. (R. 1902, V. V., pp. 33-34). 
GRCC then called John Vetere who attested he was the president of the canal 
company in 1981 and he had never been told about the change application of Wilson to year 
round use. (id. at 95). He attested the water shortage problems began in 1962. (id. at 100). 
Every year since 1992 there had been a shortage of water, (id. at 101). He learned of the 
power project in about 1991 or 1992. (id. at 108). Robert Quist, shareholder of GRCC, was 
called and attested he learned that Thayns were generating power for sale in 1992 and had 
no knowledge of the present project before then. (id. at 135). He acknowledged that Thayns 
appeared at board meetings when they were asked to and answered questions when they 
were asked, (id. at 137). 
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Edward Hansen was called, who was on the board of directors of GRCC from 1990 
to 1995. (id. at 149). He testified that he was expecting Thayns to pay a royalty on the 
power generation, (id. at 154). 
Glen Baxter was called and testified that he first learned of the electrical power for 
sale being done by Thayns in 1992. (id. at 178). 
Judy Scott, secretary/treasurer of GRCC since 1985, attested that she wasn't aware 
Thayns were building a hydro electric plant from 1985 to 1991. Jack Erwin, GRCC board 
member from 1980 to 1983, 1988 to 1990, and 1993 to current attested that GRCC took no 
action against Thayns to stop refurbishing of the pump house. (R. 1902, V., VI, p.48). He 
attested Leon Thayn said he wasn't going to sell power in 1990. (id at 50). He further 
attested that they had problems since 1992. (id. at 54). 
Tim Vetere was recalled and attested that in 1992 the board made a decision that they 
would talk to the Thayns about sharing the revenues the way that they had promised back 
in 1985 (National Hydro), (id. at 89). He was not aware of any other promises made by 
Thayns to GRCC except the National Hydro project, (id. at 94-97). 
At trial Thayn also introduced Exhibit 49 which was the environmental assessment 
impact statement prepared by Ron Hagan, GRCC shareholder and was almost elected board 
member in the January 18,1990 annual stockholder's meeting. (R. Ex. 99,1/09/90 minutes). 
This environmental study was sent to Leon Thayn after doing an impact study of the 
proposed co-generation project and provided specifically, with respect to the canal company, 
"The Green River Canal Company & local farmers and area residents are in favor of this 
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project. Not aware of anyone opposed to this project". (R. Ex. 49, p. 3) {emphasis added}. 
Thayn also admitted Exhibit 48 which was the 1982 protest to the application to increase 
Thayn's water right by an additional 4,100 for the National Hydro project. GRCC 
specifically protested that. That protest was in response to an application that specified that 
Thayn had already received a 600 year round use right from the State Engineer. 
How can the Court rule that GRCC had no knowledge that Thayn was asserting a 600 
non-consumptive use right when it, in fact, protested an application which, by its very terms, 
declared such right of record? Thayn also submitted the minutes of GRCC which showed 
that on January 8,m 1985 the minutes of GRCC reflect that Leon Thayn explained about his 
new deal, he said he would mount a new agreement with the canal company that would 
eliminate the National Hydro. (Ex. 99, 1/8/85 minutes). The March 14, 1989 minutes of 
GRCC reflect that "Jack Erwin asked if they were going to put power in there. Leon said 
the building was being put in with that capacity. If something developed, the canal company 
would share in power as previously agreed". (R. Ex. 99, 3/14/89 minutes). And finally, the 
minutes of January 7, 1992 state: 
Gene Dunham asked about the raceway and status with Thayns on power 
plant. Some discussion by stockholders who were there when commitments 
were made as to canal co.s' status. Need to review previous agreement and 
update if needed. Judy referred to minutes for the 3/14/89 meeting when Leon 
Thayn was present. Gene Dunham and Clell Duncan said they had discussed 
this with Leon at a Soil Conservation meeting recently and he indicated the 
first couple of years would be very costly but the 3 to 5 year period should 
have some revenue. Indicated that 1 Vi cents is what UP&L will pay." (Ex. 
98 1/7/92 minutes) 
To find that GRCC was in the dark about the plans of the Thayns to build a power 
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plant based upon its own minutes, the testimony of its own board of directors, and the 
evidence as set forth above is preposterous and disingenuine. It's clear that GRCC 
knowingly allowed Wilson to increase his water right to 600 cfs year round because he was 
"a good ole boy". 
GRCC had, in opposition to this evidence, the testimony of Tim Vetere and the 
testimony of the secretary/treasurer, all of whom took their respective offices in 
approximately 1991 or thereafter, who say they did not know of the intention of Thayn to 
go forward with hydro electric power until after the plant was online in 1992. However, that 
testimony cannot be reconciled with those who were in the position of power at GRCC at 
the time, in question, i.e. after the National Hydro project up until the construction began. 
Accordingly, this Court should find that the Findings of Fact set forth above are not 
sustainable by the evidence and, in fact, are contrary to it. See e.g. Keith MacKay and State 
Stone, Inc v Roy E. Hardy and Rex L. Jackson, 973 P.2d 941 (Ut. 1998) (proper remedy for 
a mistake in the Findings of Fact is to appeal and challenge the findings under the clearly 
erroneous standard. 
For the foregoing reasons the matter should be reversed and the Court should direct 
the lower court to enter findings in accordance with the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence and afford Defendant Thayn its defense under all three (3) theories, i.e. estoppel, 
waiver, and latches. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the lower court should be reversed under 
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issue numbers I, II, III, IV, V, and VI. In the alternative, judgment should be reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings under VII, and VIIL Thayn should be awarded his costs 
and attorney's fees on appeal. 
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A G R E E M E N I 
This agreement made and entered into this ~3 O day of 
?^—^=£*~-. , 1952, by and between the GREEN RIVER CANAL 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, First Party, and S. M. WILSON, STEWART 
B. WILSON, LORIN H. WILSON , M. J. WILSON and F. M. WILSON, doing 
i 
business as co-partners under the name and style of WILSON PRODUCE 
COMPANY, Second Party, 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto made and entered into an 
agreement under date of April 5, 1952, the purpose and intent of 
which agreement was to fix and determine the respective parties* 
rights and obligations with respect to a certain dam and diverting 
works jointly used by the said parties, and situated on the Green 
River, in Emery County, Utah; and 
WHEREAS, there has arisen some question as to the intent 
and meaning of the paragraph numbered 6 of said agreement; and 
WHEREAS, it is the mutual desire of the parties hereto 
to dispel any doubt as to what was tniended by said paragraph 6, 
and to settle the meaning thereof, beyond question; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises fcnd of 
the mutual covenants and agreements set forth in said original 
agreement and by way of supplement to said original agreement, it 
is hereby mutually understood and agreed as follows: 
lm That the meaning of paragraph 6 of said original 
agreement was intended to be that the first party should have a 
priority of diversion, and should be entitled to take whatever 
water should be needed by the said first party or its stockholders 
before the second party should be entitled to divert any water 
through or over the dam and diversion works; and that the quantity 
of water needed should be exclusively determined by the said first 
-2-
party. However, it was and is also mutually understood and agreed 
that the first party claims for the uses of its stockholders 80 
second feet of water as particularly set forth in -that certain 
diligence claim No, 46 on file and of record in the office of the 
State Engineer of the State of Utah and that after said rights are 
satisfied through diversion at said dam and diverting works that 
the water rights of the second party as set forth in its water 
filing about to be issued by said State Engineer for 35 second feet 
of water for irrigation uses upon approximately 1325 acres of land, 
as well as its filings for power purposes to pump said water in 
not to exceed 400 second feet or such lesser amount as may be 
approved by the State Engineer of the State of Utah shall then be 
satisfied through diversions at said dam and diverting works be-
fore any other or additional diversions are made, by the first 
paxty. 
2# That this agreement, when executed by the respective 
parties hereto, shall be attached to and become a part of the 
original agreement more specifically described above. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set. their 
hands to this instrument in duplicate the day and year first above 
written 
FIRST PARTYx 












FRANCIS M. WILSON , 
. s-> STEWART B. WILSON 
LOR IN H. WILSON 
Co-Partners 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF EMERY) 
, On this 
before me DELB£RT 
to me that they are 
S ° day of ^±s£2fedfe£fc-_> 19: J£~^7U^L*JL-
 f 952, personally appeared 
TIDWELL and O T T C T AHDERSON, who duly acknowledged 
the President and Secretary,* respectively, of 
tKe Green River Canal Company, a corporation, one of the signers of 
the foregoing instrument; that they signed the foregoing instrument 
on behalf of said corporation pursuant to a resolution of the Board 
of Directors thereof and also pursuant to a resolution of the stock-
holders thereof adopted at a special meeting duly called and held 
for such purpose and the said officers duly acknowledged to me that 
said corporation executed said agreeme; 
My Commission Expires: 
Residence; ( j / ^ t ^ ^ s / ^ ^ V ^ L 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF EMERY) 
On this 5LJQ__ day ofJ±Ad.e3^i., 1952, personally appeared 
before me S. M. WILSON, STEWART^*. WILSON, LORIN H. WILSON, M. J. 
WILSON and F. M. WILSON, co-partners, doing business under ,the name 
and style of WILSON PRODUCE COMPANY, a co-partnership, the signers 
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 




A G R E E M E N T 
This agreement made and entered into this 5th day of April, 
1952, by and between GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a Utah corporation 
with its principal place of business at Green River, Utah, First 
Party, and S. M. WILSON, STEWART B* WILSON, LORIN H. WILSON, M. J. 
WILSON and F. M, WILSON, doing business as co-partners under the 
name and style of WILSON PRODUCE COMPANY, Second Party, 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the first party is a mutual irrigation company and 
for many years has been and now is diverting waters from the Green 
River in Emery County, Utah, by means of a dam across said Green 
River and by use of a certain race way, canal and other diverting 
works in connection therewith; and 
WHEREAS, the second party is the owner of most of the lands 
lying under what is commonly known as the 42-foot canal which lands 
are likewise irrigated by waters diverted from the said Green River 
by means of said dam and diverting works, and the w?ters are there-
upon pumped from pits at the end of said race way into the said 42-
foot canal and thence transported through said 42-foot canal to 
the said lands of the second party; and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto on January 2, 1930 made and 
entered into a certain agreement pertaining to the said dam, di-
verting works, race way, pits and other properties situated upon 
Lot 4, Section 17, Township 20 South, Range 16 East of the Salt 
Lake Meridian; and 
WHEREAS, disputes have arisen from time to time between the 
parties hereto with respect to said agreement and the respective 
rights and obligations of the parties hereto thereunder and an 
action was filed by the first party against the Green River Irri-
gation Company and others in the EJistrict Court Within and for 
u<->> action the second party 
appeared as an intervenor and in which action a judgment and decree 
was executed on August 19, 1939 by District Judge Lewis Jones and 
said judgment provided, among other things, that the second party 
by reason of the said contract of January 2, 1930 was estopped to 
assert or claim that the first party was not the owner of said Lot 
4 and the improvements thereon so long as said contract should re-
main in force and effect; and 
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the parties hereto to fcrever 
settle and put at rest their differences and adopt a permanent 
plan for the operation -of said diverting works and to also divide 
the area comprising said Lot 4 between them in accordance with 
their just needs and to their mutual advantage; and 
T/HEREAS, on or about July 15, 1942 the Green River Irriga-
tion Company filed an action in the District Court Within and for 
Emery County, State of Utah, against the first party herein seek-
ing to quiet title to said Lot 4 and in said action the first 
party herein filed a counter-claim seeking to quiet its title to 
said Lot 4 and said action has not *s yet been disposed of; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premies and of the 
covenants herein set forth and in the event and only in the event 
the first party is successful in the said pending litigation be-
tween.'it and the Green River Irrigation Company, to the end that 
title to said Lot 4 is finally quieted in the first party, then 
it is understood and agreed as follows: 
1* Said agreement of January 2, 1930 between the parties 
hereto shall be terminated. 
2 # The first party shall convey to the second party by 
quitclaim deed the following portions of said Lot 4 in Emery 
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Beginning at a point 195 feet east of the southwest 
corner of said Lot 4 artd running thence north* 50 feet; 
thence west to the said County Road right of way; 
thence southerly along said County Road right of way 
to a point due west of the place of beginning; thence 
east to the point of beginning* 
Beginning at a point 245 feet east and 170 feet north 
of the southwest corner of Lot 4, Section 17, ^ownship 
20 South, Range 16 East of the Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; and running thence south 80° 00' east 69 feet; 
thence north 6° 00f east 220 feet; thence north 87° 00* 
wesx 55 feet; thence south 13° 00 • east 90 feet; thence 
south 7° 30' west 110 feet more or less to the point of 
beginning, together with all improvements thereon and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
3. The second party shall make, execute and deliver to the 
first party a quitclaim deed to the following described real prop-
erty in Emery County, State of Utah: 
All of said Lot 4, less the lands described in paragraph 
No* 2 immediately next preceeding* 
4. ^he own e r s h i p , m a i n t e n a n c e , upkeep, repair, supervision, 
control and operation of the said race way and d i v e r t i n g works 
situated upon the real p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d in par a g r a p h 3. of this 
agreement as well as the ow n e r s h i p , m a i n t e n a n c e s , upkeep, repair, 
supervisioft, control and o p e r a t i o n of said dam shall be and remain 
with the first party at all tim e s * The ownership, maintenance, 
-3-
upkeep, repair, supervision, control and operation of said divert-
ing works situated upon the lands hereinabove described in para-
graph 2, shall be and remain with the second party. Each party 
agrees to keep the portion of said diverting works under its super-
vision in a state of reasonably good repair and condition so that 
insofar as the diverting works situated on the lands described in 
paragraphs 2.and 3. respectively of this agreement are integral 
to or essential to the use, operation and enjoyment of the other 
party that the same v/ill be maintained and kept in reasonably good 
repair and condition at all times. In this connection it is under-
stood and agreed that the water belonging to the second party oust 
be diverted by means of said dam and by means of the said race way 
and diverting works situated on the lands described in paragraph 
3. hereof and the second party agrees to annually pay on or before 
the 1st day of February of each year commencing with the year 1953, 
one-half of the cost of the maintenance, control, supervision, re-
pair, upkeep and operation of said dam, diverting works, race way 
ana all other property described in paragraph 3* which are joint-
ly used by the parties hereto. The first party shall furnish to 
the second party on or before the 1st day of January of the year 
1953 and on or before January 1 of each succeeding year an item-
ized statement of the said expenses for the preceeding twelve-
month period. It is specifically provided, however, that if the 
first party receives from any other person, firm or corporation, 
any consideration in money,,work or otherwise for the maintenance, 
upkeep,~repair, supervision or control of said dam, diverting works, 
race way or lands adjacent thereto which are jointly used by the 
parties then and in that event the consideration so received shall 
first be deducted from the whole of said expenses and .after said 
deductions the remainder of said expenses shall be divided equally 
between the parties hereto. The second party shall pay its own 
and repair of the race way, pits and diversion works situated upon 
the property hereinabove described in paragraph 3, In the event 
the second party fails to pay its portion of said costs and ex-
penses as herein provided the second party shall not have the 
right to receive or divert any water through said diverting works 
until said costs shall have been paid together with interest on 
any delinquent sum at the rate of eight percent (B%) per annum. 
This remedy is specified for the benefit of the first party and 
is optional, cumulative and not exclusive. In other words, the* 
first party may at its option also bring suit to enforce the pay- -
ment of such amount or may pursue any other remedy* which* mary be 
available at law or equity. 
•5. Each party hereto shall have the right at all reasonable 
times to enter upon and pass over the property of the other here-
inabove described in connection with the reasonable use to be made 
by each party of the land to be quitclaimed to it as hereinabove 
particularly set forth and in particular but not by way of limita-
tion the first party shall have a right cf way to r.ross over the 
area which is now covered with planks in front of the pumping plant 
situated on the lands described in parcel 3 of paragraph 3 qbovp 
and the road way leading thereto from the County Road. 
6. It is understood and agreed that before the party of the 
second part can or may use any water from said dam, diverting works 
or race way that the first party shall have enough and sufficient 
water to supply its stockholders. The quantity of water to supply 
the stockholders of the first party is to be exclusively determined 
by the first party, 
7. This agreement shall constitute a covenant running with 
the said lands in said Lot 4 insofar as the respective-parties, 
their successors and assigns are concerned, and it shall be binding 
upon and shall inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns 
of the respective parties. In this connection it is understood and 
agreed that the second party contemplates the formation of an irri-
gation company to handle 'and distribute waters under the said 42-
foot canal and that when and if any such company is formed by the 
second party then the second party shall have the right to convey 
the lands described in paragraph 2. of this agreement to such new 
company and to assign this contract thereto. Neither the second 
party, nor its successor or assigns or their successive successors 
or assigns shall have the tight to make any such transfer and/or 
assignment to more than one corporation or partnership at any par-
ticular time because to so do would unduly burden the first party 
in its administration of said dam, race way and diverting works 
and in the collection of the monies to be paid by the second party, 
its successors and assigns. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands 




GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a 
dorporation 
By , g ^ g ^ & ^ ^ ^ * ^ ^ 
Itfs President 
SECOND-PARTY: 
WILSON^PRODUCE COMPANY, a 
c o-p^ufflLe r^h i j ]12bL&Ld^.-
,<J^1J\*>\ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF EMERY) 
Personally appeared before me this £L2L day of April, 1952 
S. M. WILSON, STEWART B. WILSON, LORIN H. WILSON, M. J. WILSON 
and F. M, WILSON co-partners doing business under the name and 
style of WILSON PRODUCE COMPANY, a co-partnership, the signers^of 
the foregoing instrument who duly ackr/owledged to me that they — 
executed--the same* 
My commission expires: NoJ^ ft-y PuUic 
Residence .rf-Utah 
TabC 
J. Craig Smith (4143) 
David B. Hartvigsen (5390) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P-C 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile; (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Green River Canal Company 
i' MAR I 4 ZOOi • 
t \ 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, 





JUDGMENT ON THE FIRST, FOURTH, 
EIGHTH AND NINTH CAUSES OF 
ACTION, AND ON THE AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSES OF ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, 
AND LACHES 
Civil No. 95-070-6174 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The above-captioned matter came before this Court in a 10-day non-jury trial beginning on 
May 18, 1999 and ending on June 22, 1999. Plaintiff Green River Canal Company ("Canal 
Company") was represented by J. Craig Smith, David B. Hartvigsen, and Daniel J. McDonald of 
Nielsen & Senior and Defendant Lee Thayn (uMi\ Thayn") was represented by Reed L. Martineau 
and Rex E. Madsen of Snow, Christenscn & Martineau, The Court, having reviewed and considered 
the all of the relevant evidence and law with respect to the Canal Company's First, Fourth, Eighth, 
and Ninth Causes of Action as set forth in its Second Supplemental Complaint, as well as the claims 
of estoppel, waiver, and laches raised by Mr. Thayn as defenses to those claims, having considered 
105369.GR255.001 
the arguments and memoranda of the parties and the prior rulings of the Court, having entered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on these claims, and otherwise being fully advised in the 
premises; 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1, The Court's Order on Plaintiffs and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment 
and on Defendant's Motion to Strike dated September 9,1997 and filed on September 103 1997 is 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
2> The Canal Company owns the water diversion facilities on the Green River north of 
the City of Green River, e.g., the dam, raceway, and control gates at the head of the raceway on the 
property owned by the Canal Company. 
3. The Canal Company has the right to use the first 80 cfs diverted through the Canal 
Company's diversion facilities during the irrigation season (March 15 to November 1) and the first 
20 cfs during the non-irrigation season (November 2 to March 14). 
4. Mr. Thayn has the right to use the iiQxt 35 cfs for irrigation purposes during the 
irrigation season and up to 400 cfs during the irrigation season to pump the irrigation water up to Mr. 
Thayn's canal. 
5. Mr. Thayn is permanently enjoined from using the Canal Company's diversion 
facilities to divert water for any other purposes other than for irrigation and for generating power to 
pump said irrigation water up to Mr. Thayn's canal, unless and until he obtains that Canal 
Company's express written consent and agreement to the use of its diversion facilities for such 
purposes. 
105369.QR2J5.001 2 
6. Mr. Thayn is permanently enjoined from using the Canal Company's diversion 
facilities to divert any more than 35 cfs of for irrigation purposes and up to 400 cfs of water for 
generating power to pump said irrigation water up to Mr. Thayn* s canal, unless and until he obtains 
that Canal Company's express written consent and agreement to the use of its diversion facilities for 
such additional quantities. 
7. Mn Thayn is further enjoined permanently from diverting any water for any purposes 
until the Canal Company has received its full entitlement to 80 cfs of water during the imgation 
season and 20 cfs of water during the non-irrigation season. 
8. Mr. Thayn is ordered to pay S7.518.50 in attorney fees incurred by the Canal 
Company in defending against Mr. Thayn's efforts to obtain a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction, plus $1,614.00 in attorney fees and 5734,00 in costs incurred by the Canal 
Company in defending against Mr, Thayn's efforts to appeal the Court's ruling on said temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction, for a total of $9,866.50. 
9. ML Thayn is ordered to pay all taxable costs associated with the Canal Company's 
Causes of Action, other than the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action which dealt with the 
trespass portion of the case. 
DATED this 4 2 . day of ^y/Ui^iL , 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
rr-
U ^ / C J ^ - 7 1 v >***#*?** 
Bryce PyBryner, Judge 
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Approved as to Form: 
Reed L. Martineau 
Rex E. Madsen 
Counsel for Mr. Tliayn 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of , 2001, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoiug JUDGMENT ON THE FIRST, FOURTH, EIGHTH AND NINTH CAUSES 
OF ACTION, AND ON THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, AND 
LACHES was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to the following: 
Reed L, Martineau, Esq, 
Rex E. Madsen, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
10S309.CR255.001 4 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 





Dated this m day of AWA 
REED L. MARTINEAU 
ATTORNEY 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11TH 
FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 8414S 
J CRAIG SMITH 
ATTORNEY 
SO E. SOUTH TEMPLE; BOX 
11808 
SUITE 110 0, EAGLE GATE PLAZA 




J. Craig Smith (4143) 
David B. Hartvigsen (5390) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P-C. 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Green River Canal Company 
MAR I 4 2001 
COUriT/£l/.?Rv 
J I 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, 





FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING 
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, AND LACHES 
Civil No. 95-070-6174 
Judge Brycc K. Bryner 
The abovc-captioned matter was tried before the Seventh District Court, the Honorable Bryce 
IC Biyner presiding, in a 10-day non-jury trial beginning on May 18, 1999 and ending on June 22, 
1999, Plaintiff Green River Canal Company ("Canal Company") was represented by J, Craig Smith, 
David B> Hartvigsen, and Daniel J. McDonald of Nielsen & Senior and Defendant Lee Thayn ("Mr. 
Thayn") was represented by Rccd L. Martineau and Rex E. Madsen of Snow, Chrislcnscn & 
Martincau. Having reviewed and considered the relevant evidence and law with respect to the claims 
of estoppel, waiver, and laches raised by Mr. Thayn as defenses to the enforcement of the terms of 
1952 Agreement and Amendment and having considered the arguments and memoranda of the 
parties, the Court enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
(General) 
1. The Canal Company owns certain water diversion facilities on the Green River north 
of Lhc City of Green River, e.g., a dam, raceway, and control gates at the head of the raceway utilized 
by the Canal Company and Mr. Thayn. 
2. The Canal Company has a diligence water right with an 1880 priority for 80 cfs 
during the irrigation season and 20 cfs during the non-irrigation season to be diverted through said 
diversion facilities. 
3. In 1933, Mr. Thayn's predecessor, Wilson Produce, filed an application for 35 cfs of 
water for irrigation purposes, also to be diverted through said diversion facilities, 
4. The Canal Company and Wilson Produce, entered into an agreement and an 
amendment thereto in 1952 ("1952 Agreements") which set forth the rights and obligations of the 
two parties with respect to Wilson Produce's the use of the Canal Company's diversion facilities. 
5. In 1974, Wilson Produce filed an application with the State Engineer to allow for the 
diversion of 600 cfs for "power to pump" purposes during the irrigation season. 
6. In 1981, Mr, Thayn, as successor to Wilson Produce, filed a change application with 
the State Engineer seeking to change the period of use of that 600 cfs to year-round. The application 
did not seek to change the nature of use of the water. 
7> The Canal Company did not protest either application and both were approved by the 
State Engineer of Utah. 
8. In a 1983 agreement between the parties as part of the proposed "National Hydro 
Project5' that later failed, Mr. Thayn acknowledged that the total capacity of the raceway at that time 
was 600 cfs. 
105369.GR255.001 2 
9. The Canal Company has the right to the first 80 cfs in the raceway and Mr. Thayn has 
the right to 35 cfs for irrigation, thus leaving a maximum of only 485 cfs in the raceway for other 
purposes, such as pumping, as opposed to 600 cfs. 
10. In about 1987 or 1988, Mr. Thayn began renovating and updating his pump house, 
which is at the end of the Canal Company's raceway. 
11. In July of 1990, Mr. Thayn first formed an intent to proceed with hydro-clcctric 
power generation for commercial sale. 
12. Mr. Thayn began generating hydro-electric power for commercial sale in April of 
1992. 
13. Immediately after Mr. Thayn began generating hydro-clcctric power for commercial 
sale, Mr. Thayn's diversion rates increased and the Canal Company began experiencing problems 
in obtaining a constant flow of 80 cfs. 
14. Mr. Thayn first asserted his claim to a right to use the Canal Company's diversion 
facilities to divert 600 cfs for commercial power generation at a board meeting of the Canal 
Company on June 24,1992, at which time an objection to that claim was immediately voiced by the 
Canal Company. 
15. Mr. Thayn first learned of the 1952 Amendment in August of 1992 when he was 
being questioned in a Canal Company Board Meeting about his commercial hydro-clcctric project 
and the water diversion problems, 
16. Between 1992 and 1995 when this action was filed, the Canal Company initiated 
ongoing discussions regarding these problems with Mr. Thayn. 
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17. Mr. Thayn's water diversion rates were measured at 638 cfs in February of 1993 as 
shown in Mr. Thayn's 1997 Proof of Diversion filed with the State Engineer on the 600 cfs water 
right. 
18. Recent measurements have shown that Mr. Thayn was diverting as much as 750 cfs 
on May 5, 1999. 
19. Prior to the 1993 flow measurement, neither party knew how much water Mr. Thayn 
was diverting. 
20. Mr. Thayn never notified the Canal Company of his intent to generate electrical 
power for commercial sale. 
(Waiver) 
21. The Canal Company did not intend to relinquish either the quantity or nature of use 
limitations in the 1952 Agreements. 
22. The Canal Company did not make a distinct relinquishment of the quantity or nature 
of use limitations. 
23. The Canal Company did not know, nor sshould have known, that Mr. Thayn was 
unaware of the 1952 Agreements prior to August of 1992. 
(Laches) 
24. There was no lack of diligence on the pari of the Canal Company. 
25. Mr. Thayn did not suffer an injury as the result of any lack of diligence on the part 
of the Canal Company. 
(Estoppel) 
26. Leon Thayn told certain board members of the Canal Company that the pump house 
facilities were in need of refurbishing and upgrading. 
4 
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27, Although some of the Canal Company's board members knew that Mr. Thayn was 
renovating his facilities and that generators were being delivered to the pump house, ihcy were not 
aware that he was going to generate power for sale until the sspring of 1992 when Mr, Thayn began 
generating commercial power and using more water. 
28. Neither Mr, Thayn nor anyone else informed the Canal Company prior to April of 
1992 that Mr. Thayn was going to generate commercial power as part of the pump house facilities 
renovation and upgrade project. 
29. Mr. Thayn never gave notice of any intent to divert more than 435 cfs through the 
raceway in contravention of the 1952 Agreements. 
30, Mr. Thayn had no measurements showing that he or any of his predecessors had ever 
diverted more than a total of 435 cfs prior to April of 1992 when he began generating power for 
commercial sale. 
3L The Canal Company never acted inconsistently with respect to its contract rights 
under the 1952 Agreements, specifically including the quantity and nature of use limitations 
contained therein. 
32. Any injuries to Mr. Thayn were of his own making, were not caused by any action 
or inaction on the part of the Canal Company, and were prior to the time when the Canal Company 






CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(General) 
1. Mr. Thayn is the successor to Wilson Produce with respect to the 1952 Agreements. 
2. Leon Thayn and Rick Kastcr are Mr. Thayn's agents and representatives with respect 
to his dealings with the Canal Company. 
3. The 1952 Agreements govern the relationship between the Canal Company and Mr. 
Thayn concerning the use of the Canal Company's diversion facilities. 
4. The 1952 Agreements allow Mr. Thayn to use the Canal Company's diversion 
facilities, Among other things, it establishes that the Canal Company has the right to the first 80 cfs 
of water diverted through the facilities and limits the quantity of water Mr, Thayn may diverl 
tlirough the facilities thereafter to a maximum of 435 cfs. It also limits the nature of use for which 
such water may be diverted, i.e., up to 35 cfs may be used for irrigation purposes and up to 400 cfs 
may be used to pump the irrigation water up to Mr. Thayn's own canal. 
5. Mr. Thayn is contractually prohibited from diverting water through the Canal 
Company's diversion facilities for any other purposes, or in any amounts beyond those specified in 
the preceding paragraph. 
6. Mr. Thayn has breached the 1952 Agreements by diverting more water than allowed 
thereunder. 
7. Mr. Thayn has breached the 1952 Agreements by diverting and using water for 
purposed other than those allowed thereunder. 
(Waiver) 
8. The applicable burden of proof that Mr. Thayn must meet in order to establish his 
waiver defense is a preponderance of the evidence, 
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9. The Canal Company did not expressly waive its rights to enforce either the quantity 
or nature of use limitations contained in the 1952 Agreements. 
10. The Canal Company was under no legal duty to inform Mr. Thayn of the existence 
of the 1952 Agreements, 
11. Mr, Thayn bears the burden of discovering any encumbrances or limitations upon the 
property and water rights he purchased from Wilson Produce. 
12. The 1974 water right application and the 1981 change application did not impose any 
affirmative duty upon the Canal Company to act. 
13. The approval of said applications by the State Engineer did not grant Mr. Thayn any 
right to exceed the limitations in the 1952 Agreements. 
14. Despite the approval of said applications, Mr. Thayn still needed to obtain permission 
from the Canal Company before he could change or expand the quantity or nature of use limitations 
in the 1952 Agreements. 
15. The approval of said applications did not affect the rights of the Canal Company 
concerning the control and use of its own property, i.e, the diversion facilities and raceway. 
Therefore, the Canal Company had no legal duty to act or protest said applications or approvals. 
16. Mr. Thayn has failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
as to any of the following mandatory elements for his waiver defense: (1) a relinquishment of these 
contractual rights and limitations; (2) that was clearly intended; and (3) distinctly made. 
17. The Canal Company did not waive any of its rights under the 1952 Agreements and 
is therefore entitled to enforce the tenms thereof as previously determined in the Court's Orders dated 
September 9, 1997 and March 13, 1999. 
105369 CR2SS 001 7 
(Laches) 
18. The applicable burden of proof that Mr. Thayn must meet in order to establish his 
laches defense is & preponderance of the evidence. 
19. Because the Canal Company had no duty to act as set forth above, there can be no 
lack of diligence by the Canal Company in taking any required actions. 
20. Because there was no lack of diligence by the Canal Company, there can be no injury 
to Mr. Thayn attributable to a lack of diligence. 
21. Mr. Thayn has failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
as to either of the mandatory elements for his laches defense, i.e, a lack of diligence by the Canal 
Company or an injury to Mr, Thayn that was caused by such a lack of diligence. 
22. The defense of laches is not applicable in this matter and therefore the Canal 
Company is entitled to enforce the terms of the 1952 Agreements as previously determined in the 
Court's Orders dated September 9, 1997 and March 13, 1999. 
(Estoppel) 
23. The applicable burden of proof that Mr. Thayn must meet in order to establish his 
estoppel defense is clear and convincing evidence. 
24. Because Mr, Thayn did not form an intent to proceed with the commeicial hydro-
electric project until July of 1990, the conduct of the parties prior to that date is irrelevant to the issue 
of estoppel, 
25. The Canal Company's board members were justifiably not alarmed or put on notice 
of any intent to violate the 1952 Agreements by such renovation work. 
26. The 1983 agreement between the parties with respect to the "National Hydro Piojccl" 
did not constitute consent by the Canal Company to use of the laceway to divert GOO cfs because Mr. 
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Thayn had acknowledged in that same agreement that the total capacity of the raceway in 1983 was 
600 cfs, which left only 485 cfs of capacity available in the raceway for other purposes. It also pre-
dated the formation of Mr. Thayn's intent to proceed with the present project. 
27. The 1981 newspaper article in the Sun Advocate did not give notice of any intent to 
build the present hydro-electric project because it was vague and general in nature and preceded the 
actual generation of power as well as the formation of the intent to do the present projecl by 
approximately 10 years. 
28. The minutes of the Canal Company's board meetings do no evidence any awareness 
by the Canal Company that Mr, Thayn was claiming a right to use Canal Company facilities to divert 
600 cfs for commercial power generation until June 24, 1992, at which time an objection to that 
claim was immediately voiced. 
29. Mr, Thayn's filing for and receiving a water right for 600 cfs did not impart any 
notice to the Canal Company that Mr. Thayn intended to divert more than 435 cfs tliroiigh the 
raceway in contravention of the 1952 Agreements. 
30. Mr. Thayn's pre-1992 actual water use did not impart any notice to the Canal 
Company that Mr. Thayn intended to divert more than 435 cfs thiough the raceway in contravention 
of the 1952 Agreements. 
31. Mr, Thayn's actions in renovating his facilities and adding electrical power generation 
equipment without informing the Canal Company of his intentions or claim to a right to divert 600 
cfs through the Canal Company's facilities were made in spite of, rather than in reliance upon, the 
Canal Company's conduct with respect to its rights under the 1952 Agreements. 
32. Mr. Thayn has failed to meet his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence 
as to any of the mandatory elements for his estoppel defense, i.e.: (1) that the Canal Company's 
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conduct was inconsistent with its present claims; (2) that Mr, Thayn acted reasonably in reliance on 
the Canal Company's earlier conduct; and (3) that Mr, Thayn would be injured if the Canal 
Company were allowed to now change positions. 
33. The Canal Company is not estopped from asserting or enforcing any of its rights 
under the 1952 Agreements and is therefore entitled to enforce the terms thereof as previously 
determined in the Court's Orders dated September 951997 and March 13, 1999, 
DATED this /j day of Wh^^\ 2001, 
Approved as to Form; 
BY THE COURT: 
Rccd L. Martineau 
Rex E. Madscn 
Counsel for Mr. Thayn 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _ day of , 2001, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING 
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, AND LACHES was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to the following; 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Rex E. Madsen, Esq. 
Snow, Christcnscn & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
l05369.GR255.00t u 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 950706174 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail REED L. MARTINEAU 
ATTORNEY 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11TH 
FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 45000 
SALT LAKH CITY, UT 84145 
Mail J CRAIG SMITH 
ATTORNEY 
60 E. SOUTH TEMPLE; BOX 
11808 
SUITE 1100, EAGLE GATE PLAZA 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841111004 
Dated this iffi day of h\dmh 20 OL 
Deputy(Court Clerk 
TabE 
J. Craig Smith (4143) 
David B. Hartvigsen (5390) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Green River Canal Company 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, 
a Utah Mutual Water Company, 
: ORDER & JUDGMENT ON 
Plaintiff, : MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
v. : 
: Civil No. 95-070-6174 
LEE THAYN, 
: Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
Defendant. : 
Plaintiff Green River Canal Company, following the dissolution of a temporary restraining 
order issued by this Court on March 15,1999, filed an Application for Attorney Fees for Wrongfully 
Obtained Injunctive Relief. Defendant Lee Thayn appealed the Court's refusal to issue a preliminary 
injunction upon the termination of said order. Following the withdrawal of that appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court directed this Court to determine and award fees on appeal if it decided to award fees 
on at the trial court level. The Canal Company thereafter filed a Supplemental Affidavit for Attorney 
Fees for the fees incurred on the appeal. The matter was briefed by the parties and on November 1, 
2000, the Court entered a ruling awarding certain fees and costs. The Court, having considered the 
arguments and memoranda of the parties and being otherwise fully advised in the premises; 
\— 
,
 ; NOV 2 7 ^ 0 / 
1 
CQi iPT/l?%' Eny 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant in the amount of $7,518.50 
for attorneys fees (after deducting 5.0 hours of duplicated time by co-counsel during the site visit) 
and no costs at the trial court level, plus $1,614.00 for attorneys fees and 5734,00 for costs on appeal, 
for a total amount of S97866.50 incurred by Plaintiff in defending against Defendant's wrongful 
efforts to obtain injunctive relief. 
DATED this / / day of November, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
< V A ^ „ ^ 
Bryce K.7Bryner, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this lOtft day of November, 2000, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order & Judgment on Motion for Attorney Fees was hand-delivered to the following: 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Rex E. Madsen, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TabF 
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GreenRiver i I 
I SEVENTH DISTRICT 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN ANXiFOI^—°—~^-^ 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION RE 
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, AND LACHES 
Plaintiff, ) 
VS. ) 
LEETHAYN, ) Civil No. 950706174 
Defendant. ) Judge Biyce K. Bryncr 
Under the court's prior rulings, the issues of estoppel, waiver, and laches were reserved 
for trial. The court heard the sworn testimony of the witnesses, received exhibits into evidence, 
and allowed counsel to file post-trial memorandum. The court has read the memorandum, 
considered the evidence and the law, and now issues this memorandum decision. 
I Standard of Proof 
The court finds that the standard of proof as to the issue of estoppel is clear and 
convincing and that the standard of proof as to the issue of laches and waiver is preponderance of 
the evidence, 
II. Positions of the Parties 
The Plaintiff seeks to enforce the 1952 Agreement and Amendment that limits the 
Defendant's use of water through the raceway to 35 cfs for consumptive use and to 400 cfs for 
non-consumptive use. The Defendant defends by claiming that it filed Applications with the 
State Engineer n 1974 and 1981 to increase the non-consumptive use in the raceway to 600 cfs; 
that the Defendant and his predecessor in interest (Wilson Produce) have used 600 cfs 
continuously for non-consumptive use; that the Plaintiff did not object to the applications for 600 
cfs; that the Plaintiffs knew that the Defendant was planning on generating power for sale and 
failed to timely protest the expansion of the plant; and that the Plaintiff is therefore estopped 
from enforcing the 1952 Agreement and Amendment that limits the Defendant's use of the 
facilities to 400 cfs for non-consumptive uses. The Defendant also claims that the Plaintiff 
waived its right to limit the quantity and nature of use of the 435 cfs limitation, and thai the 
Plaintiff is prevented fay laches from enforcing the 1952 Agreements. 
m. Waiver 
On p, 3 of its Supplemental Post-Trial Memorandum, the Plaintiff concedes the first two 
elements of waiver; (1) an existing right, i.e., the 435 cfs limitation on the quantity of water that 
the Defendant may divert through the Plaintiffs facilities and the nature of the use, and (2) a 
knowledge of the existence of the right, and in this particular instance, a knowledge of the 
existence of the "quantity" and "nature of use" limitations contained in the 1952 Agreement and 
the 1952 Amendment. The Plaintiff contests the remaining three elements and the court will 
address them individually. 
As to the third, fourth, and fifth elements of waiver, i.e. a relinquishment of these 
limitations that was clearly intended and distinctly made,Ir the court finds as follows: 
1, The Plaintiff did not make an express waiver o f its right to limit the quantity and nature 
of the 435 cfs limitation- Any waiver, if made, would have to be implied. 
2. With regard to whether an implied waiver was made, after reviewing the totality of the 
circumstances, the court cannot find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff clearly 
intended or distinctly made a relinquishment of the quantity and nature of use limitations 
imposed by the 1952 Agreement and Amendment; 
A. The Plaintiffs silence complained of by the Defendant did not constitute a 
relinquishment of the quantity and nature of use limitations because the Plaintiff was under no 
legal duty to inform the Defendant of the existence of the 1952 Agreement and Amendment. 
The court is persuaded that the Defendant bears the burden of discovering the encumbrances and 
limitalions on the property and water rights he purchases, and that burden cannot be shifted to the 
Plaintiff. The court also finds that the Plaintiff in this instance cannot be presumed to know that 
the Defendant did not know of the existence of the Agreement, if m fact the Defendant did not 
know of the Agreement until August of 1992 as he claims. Moreover, no evidence was presented 
from which the court can find that the Plaintiff knew or should have known that the Defendant 
was not aware of the existence of the 1952 Agreement and Amendment prior to August of 1992. 
B. The court also finds that the Plaintiff was under no affirmative duty to act because 
of its knowledge of the 1974 water right application for 600 cfs for power to pump water and the 
1981 change application to convert that water to year around use. Even though the applications 
were approved by the State Engineer, the Defendant still had to obtain permission from the 
Plaintiffs to expand the limitations contained in the 1952 Agreement and Amendment. It is clear 
that the approval of the application did not in and of itself impose a right to exceed the 435 cfs 
limitation. Accordingly, the Plaintiff was under no obligation to protest the application because 
the Defendant would still have to obtain the Plaintiffs permission to exceed the quantity of water 
allowed to be diverted through the raceway. 
IV Laches 
To prevail on the issue of laches as a defense to the enforcement of the 1952 Agreement 
and Amendment, the Defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) a lack of 
diligence on the part of the Plaintiff, and (2) an injury to the Defendant owing to such lack of 
Plaintiffs diligence. 
From the evidence presented the court cannot find a lack of diligence on the Plaintiffs part 
when it failed to protest or object to the granting of the 1974 and 1981 applications filed by 
Wilson and Defendant. As discussed above in Section III, the State Engineer's approval of the 
application for 600 cfs did not grant the Defendant any rights with regard to the use of the 
Plaintiffs property or facilities. Because the granting of those applications did not affect the 
right of the Plaintiffs to control the use of its own property, i.e., the raceway, there was no reason 
for the Plaintiff to file or voice a protest or objection to the granting of the applications, and 
consequently there was no legal duty of Plaintiff to protest. If there was no duty to protest, then 
there can be no lack of diligence in failing to protest or object to cither of the applications. 
As to the second element of laches, ie.> whether there was an injury to Defendant owing to 
the Plaintiffs lack of diligence, the court finds that because there was no lack of diligence on the 
part of Plaintiff there can be no injury that is attributable to the lack of diligence on the part of 
Plaintiff. 
From the foregoing, the court finds that the Defendant has failed to meet his burden in 
justifying the application of the defense of laches to prevent the Plaintiff from enforcing its rights 
under the 1952 Agreement and Amendment, 
V. Estoppel 
The Defendant claims that the Plaintiff had knowledge of the Defendant's activities, his 
plans to generate power for sale, and his use of the water, and that the Plaintiff is therefore 
estopped from enforcing the 1952 Agreement and Amendment, To prevail on the issue of 
estoppel, the Defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Plaintiffs 
conduct was inconsistent with its present claims; (2) that the Defendant acted reasonably in 
reliance on the Plaintiffs earlier conduct; and (3) that the Defendant would be injured if the 
Plaintiff were allowed to now change positions. CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 
P.2d 967, 969-970 (Utah 1989). 
A. Was the Plaintiff's Conduct Inconsistent with its Present Claims? The court finds from 
the testimony of the Defendant, Rick Kaster, and Leon Thayn that the Defendant did not form the 
intent to proceed with the hydro-electric project until July of 1990. Therefore, the Plaintiff 
cannot be charged with silence or inaction prior to the time the Defendant's intent was formed, 
and there was no duty on the part of Plaintiff to take action prior to July of 1990 to counter an 
intent that was not yet formed. Thus, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff had knowledge of the 
Defendant's intent to do the hydro-electric project prior to July of 1990 because the Defendant 
had not formed the intent until that time, 
The court must now consider whether any events occurred after July ofl990 that could 
have evidenced an intent on the part of the Defendant to proceed with the project, and of which 
the Plaintiff had knowledge and was silent or took no action. The Defendant asserts that the 
Board members knew that the generators were being placed in the pumphouse for the purpose of 
generating hydro-electric power for sale. The great weight of the evidence is, however, that 
although the Board members knew that the power house had been renovated, they were not 
aware until the Spring of 1992 that the Defendant was going to generate power for sale; Jack 
Erwin, Jay Vctcrc, Tim Vetere, and Dean King each testified that they had been told by Leon 
Thayn, as the agent for Defendant, in 1990 that the Defendant was not going to generate power 
for sale. The court also finds that when the generators were delivered to the pumphouse the 
Board members who saw them were not aware that they were to be used to generate power for 
sale. Evidence was also produced from which the court finds that Leon Thayn had told the 
Board members that the pumphouse was facilities were in need of refurbishing and upgrading. 
The Board members were therefore justifiably not alarmed or put on notice of intent to violate 
the 1952 Agreements when the renovation work began. 
The court also rejects the assertion that the National Hydro Project or the 1983 agreement 
between the parties regarding the National Hydro Project evidences the Plaintiffs cousent to the 
use of the raceway to divert 600 cfs. Paragraph B of the Agreement states that the total capacity 
of the raceway is 600 cfs. Because the Plaintiff has the right to the first 80 cfs and the Defendant 
has the right to 35 cfs for irrigation, that would leave the Defendant only 485 cfs for pumping as 
opposed to the 600 cfs for pumping. This inconsistency leads the court to find that the 
Agreement did not represent the Plaintiffs consent to 600 cfs being used by the Defendant. 
The court also finds that the 1981 newspaper article in the Sun Advocate did not give notice 
of any intent to build the present hydo-elcctric plant because it was vague and general in nature 
and preceded the generation of power for sale by approximately 10 years. 
The court also finds that the minutes of the Canal Company's Board Meetings do not 
support the Defendant's position that the Board was aware that the Defendant claimed 600 cfs for 
power generation for sale: the 1985 minutes refer only to the need for a now agreement to 
eliminate National Hydro; the March 14, 1989 minutes refer only to a project in the future and do 
not mention a specific cfs; and although the minutes of June 24, 1992 reveal that the Defendant 
and his Brother stated to the Board that they had 600 cfs for non-consumptive use, Board 
member Ted Ekkcr objected by stating that the Defendant would have to release water back or 
the Canal Co. would have to take action. This represented an objection. After reviewing the 
minutes submitted as evidence the court cannot find that the Plaintiffs know, prior to June 24, 
1992, that the Defendant claimed the right to 600 cfs for non-consumptive use. 
The court also finds that neither the 1974 Water Right Application for 600 cfs nor the 
actual water use in the 1970s imparted any notice of the Defendant's intent to use water in excess 
of the amount provided for in the 1952 Agreements. The court has previously Riled that an 
application to appropriate water does not award the applicant the right to exceed a contract 
amount. Further, the court cannot find that the Defendant was diverting more than 435 cfs prior 
to April of 1992 when he began generating power. 
B. Did the Defendant Act Reasonably in Reliance on the Plaintiff's Conduct? 
The court finds that the Defendant has failed to meet the second requirement for equitable 
estoppel, i.e., that he acted reasonably in reliance on the plaintiffs conduct. The Plaintiffs 
conduct consisted of maintaining the position that the 1952 Agreements set forth the Defendant's 
quantity and nature of use of the water flowing thorough the raceway, and the court cannot find 
that the Plaintiff deviated from that position The improvements made to the pumphouse, 
including the ability to generate power for sale, were made by Defendants even though the 
Defendant was aware of the Plaintiffs position, 
C Would the Defendant be Injured if the Plaintiff were Allowed to Change Positions? 
The court finds that the Defendant has not proved the third element of equitable estoppel 
because the injuries of the Defendant were not caused by the action or inaction of the Plaintiff. 
Rather, his injuries were of his own making. The Defendant elected to proceed with the 
improvements and complete them without advising the Plaintiff until June of 1992 that he 
claimed the right to divert 600 cfs and use the additional water to generate power for sale. This 
was clearly beyond the time in which the Plaintiff could have or should have taken any action to 
object to the excess use. 
From the foregoing analysis, the court finds that the Defendant has not proved the 
affirmative defenses of waiver, laches, and estoppel. The Plaintiffs counsel is directed to 
prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment consistent with this decision, 
DATED this /O day of April, 2000. 
// Bryce K. Bryncr, Mage 
TabG 
J. Craig Smith, USB No. 4143 
David B. Hartvigsen, USB No. 5390 
Daniel J. McDonald, USB No. 7935 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile; (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Green River Canal Company 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a Utah 





ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ITS EIGHTH AND 
NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION 
ENJOINING DEFENDANT FROM 
INTERFERING WITH PLAINTIFF'S 
PRIOR RIGHT TO USE OF WATER 
AND STRIKING THE AFFIDAVIT 
OF LEON THAYN 
Civil No. 6174 
Judge Biyce K. Bryner 
The Court having reviewed and considered the Memoranda, Exhibits and Affidavits filed for 
and in opposition to Plaintiff Green River Canal Company's ("Green River") Motion for Summary 
Judgment on its Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action, and Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Leon 
Thayn, and having considered the arguments of J. Craig Smith of Nielsen & Senior, who appeared 
and argued die motions on behalf of Green River Canal Company, and the arguments of Reed 
Martineau of Snow, Christenscn and Martineau, who appeared and argued against the motions on 
behalf of Defendant Lee Thayn C'Thayn") at the hearing conducted on February 26, 1999, the Court 
does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows: 
ijk 1. Green River's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on its Eighth and Ninth 
Causes of Action, 
2. Green River holds first priority to divert and place into its canal the first eighty (80) 
cubic feet per second of water diverted by the low dam and diverted through the raceway and 
diversion facilities of Green River during the irrigation season, March 1st through November 15th 
of each year. 
3. Green River holds first priority to divert and place into its canal the first twenty (20) 
cubic feet per second of water diverted by the low dam and diverted through the raceway and 
diversion facilities of Green River during the non-inigation season, November 16th through 
February 28 of each year. 
t) K 4. The right of Thayn to divert and take water is subsequent and junior to Green River's 
right to the eighty (80) cubic feet per second during the irrigation season and twenty (20) cubic feet 
per second during the balance of the year as set forth herein. 
5, In the event that Green River is not receiving its entire water right as set forth herein, 
Thayn shall not divert or take any water. 
6. Thayn is permanently enjoined from encroaching upon or interfering with Green 
River's right to divert eighty (80) cubic feet per second of water into its canal during the irrigation 
season, and twenty (20) cubic feet per second during the balance of the year. 
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Q *• 7. The priority of the diversion of water and the quantity of Green River's right arc 
enforceable by the powers of this Court to enforce injunctions issued by this Court. 
8. The Affidavit of Leon Thayn submitted in opposition to Summary Judgment is 
stricken as hearsay, and as attempting to controvert facts previously admitted by Thayn. 
DATED this M J L day of March, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, 





RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. £174 
On March 26, 1999f the Defendant filed a motion requesting the 
court to reconsider its ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated July ll/ 1997. The court has considered the 
memorandum of counsel and the oral arguments presented on April 26, 
1999, and now issues this ruling. 
The court is persuaded by the cases cited by Defendant that 
this court has the authority to reconsider its previous ruling on 
the motion for partial summary judgment. However, the court is not 
persuaded that the motion to reconsider raises any legal theories 
or any new material facts that were not considered by the court at 
the time of the previous ruling on the motion for summary judgment. 
The motion to reconsider is therefore denied. 
DATED this ^Cr day of April, 1999. 
<2-£L- «r<3. 
BRYCE lOT BRYNER 
District Court Judge 
Sipabrc zv$ p f t a h appeal d ibove-narn&i Adgs ty: 
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CERTIFICATE QF FAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 1999, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
J. Craig Smith 
David B. Hartvigsen 
Daniel J. McDonald 
Attorneys at Law 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Reed L, Martineau 
Rex. E Madsen 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
'Mso 
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rPEEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, 





RULING ON MOTION TO F"J _M 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 6174 
Trial in this matter is scheduled to begin on May 18, 1999, 
and the Defendant's motion was filed on March 26, 1999. The 
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition and the Defendant filed 
a reply. Oral argument was conducted on April 26, 1999, The court 
has considered the memorandum and the arguments of counsel and now 
issues this ruling. 
The motion to file a Second Amended Counterclaim is denied for 
the reason that it is untimely, i.e., filed one week after the 
close of discovery and less than two months before trial, The 
court finds that the Plaintiff would be prejudiced by (1) not being 
able to engage in reasonable discovery, and (2) by not having time 
to prepare and assert a defense to the counterclaims. This could 
only be cured by granting a continuance of the trial, The court 
declines, however, to continue the trial for the reason that 
2 
several continuances have been had by the Defendant, and the 
Plaintiff is entitled^ -fco have his complaint heard. 
DATED this 
day of April, 1999. 
f f 
Tabl 
. . . . - • ••-• j 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, 
a Utah Mutual Water Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEE THAYN, j 
Defendant. ; 
: PARTIAL RULING ON GREEN 
: RIVER'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
Civil No. 6174 
Plaintiff file a Motion in Limine to which the Defendant filed 
a Memorandum in Opposition. Plaintiff filed a Reply and oral 
argument was conducted on April 26, 1999, The court took the 
matter under advisement and now issues this partial ruling on two 
of the three issues raised by Plaintiff in its motion. The court 
will issue a supplemental ruling on the issue of whether the 
Defendant should be barred from introducing evidence to show 
estoppel. 
I. FAILURE TO SUPPLEMENT DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
At oral argument on March 16, 1999, the court ruled from 
the bench that the Defendant is barred from introducing at trial 
evidence, documents or witnesses that were not disclosed in his 
answers to Plaintiff's discovery requests. Upon further review, 
the court amends the order from the bench as follows: 
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1. The Defendant is barred from introducing at 
trial any evidence, exhibit prepared by, or testimony fromr any 
expert witness that was not disclosed in Defendant's answers to 
Plaintiff's discovery requests. Pursuant to Rule 26(e)(1)(B) Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure, the Defendant was under a duty to 
supplement his answers as to experts without a request for 
supplementation from Plaintiff* 
2. The Defendant is barred from introducing any 
witness, evidence, or document from any person having knowledge of 
discoverable matters whose identity and location were not disclosed 
in Defendant's answers to Plaintiff's discovery requests. See Rule 
26(e)(1)(A), Utah Rule of Civil Procedure. 
3 - The Defendant is barred from presenting any 
evidence, witness, or document that has the effect of amending any 
prior discovery response if the Defendant knew the response was 
incorrect when made, or knows that the response, though correct 
when made, is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a 
failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing 
concealment, 
The Defendant was under a continuing obligation to make 
the above supplementation without being requested to do so by 
Plaintiff. The Defendant is not under an obligation, however, to 
supplement any of his other previous discovery responses that were 
complete when made and for which new or additional information has 
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been obtained by Defendant unless the Plaintiff has filed a request 
for supplementation, 
II- SHOULD DEFENDANT BE BARRED FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE TO 
CONTRADICT THE ADMISSIONS ON FILE? 
The Plaintiff served Defendant with Requests for 
Admiss ions dated September 24, 1998, and m an Amended Scheduling 
Order dated February 22, 1999, the court extended Defendant's time 
to respond to the discovery to March 12, 1999» Plaintiff's Motion 
in Limine is granted insofar as Defendant is barred from 
introducing any evidence to contradict the Admissions that were on 
file as of March 12, 1999. 
DATED this £?f day of April, 1999. 
BRYeE K,y-"BRYNER^  
Distri'cc Court Judge 
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RULING ON MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT AND RULING ON 
RECIPROCAL MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 6174 
Plaintiff and Defendant filed reciprocal Motions for Summary 
Judgment. Subsequent to the hearing on oral argument the Plaintiff 
submitted an Affidavit of James R. Tibbetts, The Defendant filed 
a Motion to Strike Affidavit of James R, Tibbetts, a decision on 
which is material to the arguments on the reciprocal Motions for 
Summary Judgment. A Notice to Submit for Decision was submitted on 
May 12, 1997, and the Court now issues this Ruling. 
I. MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT 
The filing of the Affidavit of James R. Tibbetts was 
untimely but that defect was cured when the Defendant subsequently 
submitted the "Second Affidavit of Lee Thayn". The Court also 
2 
finds that the Affidavit is relevant: as it addresses the issue of 
whether the Defendant increased his diversion of water in 1992. 
The Motion to Strike is therefore denied. 
II. ESTQPP5L 
The Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is estopped front 
complaining about Defendant's diversion of water because Plaintiff 
did not protest Defendant's change applications and stood idly by 
while the Defendant invested $300,000.00 in power generation 
facilities, The Court finds that there are genuine issues of 
material fact as to estoppel, laches, and waiver, which preclude 
summary judgment in favor of Defendant on this issue, e.g., whether 
Plaintiff knew Defendant was intending to generate power for re-
sale and if so, when this knowledge was obtained; the circumstances 
surrounding the Hydro Power application, etc. 
If, after trial on the issue of estoppel, the Court finds 
that the Plaintiff is not estopped from bringing this action, the 
following rulings will apply: 
III. BREACH OF AGREEMENT 
The Defendant admits that he diverted water in excess of 
435 cfs. Based thereon, the Court finds that the Defendant 
3 
breached the 1952 amendment to the agreement. The agreement and 
the amendment are unambiguous; certain, definite, and enforceable 
and limit the Defendant's diversion of water to 435 cfs for 
irrigation and for power generation to pump the water for 
irrigation, The Court rejects the notion that the agreement and 
amendment only establish priorities. It is clear to the Court that 
the parties intended the amendment to Mforever settle and put at 
rest their differences and to adopt a permanent plan for the 
operation of the diverting works.1' The contract and the amendment 
do not contemplate or provide for an enlargement of the right 
beyond 435 cfs. 
IV. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTION 
The Court also finds that by reason of the breach, GRCC 
should be entitled to an order of specific performance and an 
injunction limiting the Defendant to diverting 43 5 cfs for the 
specific purposes enumerated in the contract and agreement. To 
rule otherwise would sanction a continuing violation of the 1952 
contract and amendment and would likely result in the parties 
returning to Court numerous times in the future to consider damages 
that may accrue. 
4 
The Court also finds that there is not an adequate remedy 
at law available to the Plaintiff and that it would be extremely 
difficult if not impossible to prove damages with any degree of 
precision because of the peculiar position of the Plaintiff. If 
the Plaintiff cannot prove the amount of his damages, only nominal 
damages would be awarded which constitutes an inadequate remedy, 
V. APPLICABILITY OF SECTION,.73,-1-_?....UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Utah case law has held that Section 73-1-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, is controlling only in the absence of an enforceable 
agreement regulating the use of the water and facilities as between 
the parties. The Court finds that the above section is 
inapplicable to the instant fact situation for the reason that the 
1952 amendment constitutes an existing and enforceable agreement 
between the parties which regulates and defines their respective 
rights. The Defendant cannot therefore claim that his diversion in-
excess of 435 cfs was authorized by statute. 
Plaintiff's counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate 
summary judgment consistent with this ruling. 
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ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S AND 
DEFENDANTS MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
Civil No. 6174 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff and Defendant came on regularly for 
hearing on the 15th day of October, 1996, before the above-entitled court, the Honorable Brycc K. Biyner, 
District Judge, presiding. The Plaintiff Green River Canal Company appeared by and through its counsel, J. 
Craig Smith of Nielsen & Senior, P,C The Defendant, Lee Thayn, personally appeared and was represented 
by counsel, John F, Waldo of Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtcll. The Court, having reviewed the motions, supporting 
memoranda and affidavits and the pleadings on file herein and having heard and considered the argiunents of 
counsel, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby 
7t292.GK255,UUl 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
RECIPROCAL MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendant is not entitled as a matter 
of law to Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs causes of action, and genuine issues of material fact exist as 
to the affirmative defenses of estoppel, laches, and waiver asserted by Defendant, which preclude entry of 
summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. 
2. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted. If after trial on the issue on estoppel, the 
Court finds that the Plaintiff was not estopped from bringing this action, the following rulings will apply to 
Plaintiffs First, Third and Fourth Causes of Action: 
(a) The 1952 Agreement attached as Exhibit "A" to the Complaint and an Amendment 
that same year attached as Exhibit "B" to the Complaint are unambiguous, certain, definite, and 
enforceable and binding upon the parlies and limit the Defendant's diversion of water to 35 efs for 
iirigation and up to 400 cfs for power generation to pump the water for irrigation. 
(b) The Defendant has breached the 1952 Agreement as he has admitted to diverting 
water in excess of 435 cfs, 
(c) There is no adequate remedy at law available to Plaintiff Therefore, by reason of the 
breach, Green River is entitled to an Order of specific performance and a Permanent Injunction 
limiting the Defendant to a total of 435 cfs (35 cfs for irrigation purposes and up to 400 cfs to pump 
irrigation water), and limiting the use of water to the specific purposes enumerated in the Agreement 
and Amendment. 
3. The Court finds that § 73-1-7, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, is inapplicable to the present case. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 73-1-7 is controlling only in the absence of an enforceable agreement regulating 
the use of the water and facilities as between the parties. The 1952 Agreement as amended constitutes an 
-"•><" GR255.001 - 2 -
existing and enforceable agreement between the parties wliich regularly defines their respective rights, and the 
Defendant cannot, therefore, claim that his diversion m excess of 435 cfs was authorized by statute. 
4. The Court rejects the notion of Defendant that the Agreement and Amendment only establish 
priorities as to the use of water. 
5. The Agreement and the Amendment do not contemplate or provide for an enlargement of the 
Defendant's right to divert water beyond a total 435 cfs, 35 cfs for irrigation purposes and up to 400 cfs to 
pump irrigation water. 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT 
1. The Motion to Strike the Aff#avit of James R. Ttbbetts is denied. 
DATED this / ^ y o£3SgKtTl997. 
BY THE COURT; 
Sat 
HonoralwBrycc K. Bryner 
DistricMJourt Judge 
Approved as to form: 
'John F. Waldo, Esq. 
John W. Anderson, Esq. 
of PRUITT, GUSHEE & BACHTELL 
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